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3Executive summary
Big hydro, big solar photovoltaic (PV) and big 
wind – these are the usual focus of accounts of 
low carbon technologies in China. But a very 
different type of innovation – ranging from a 
farm cooperative in Yunnan, to woodchip and 
corn pellets in rural Beijing and air-conditioning 
using just salt and water in Hangzhou and 
Shenzhen – could be even more significant 
as examples of how to achieve a low carbon 
economy and society for China and the world. 
Radical reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions are needed if we are to mitigate 
climate change. This will require low carbon 
innovations that transform not only energy-
intensive industrial processes but also how we 
go about everyday practices. For high carbon 
economic growth is not merely a matter of 
market failure – albeit the ‘greatest example’ of 
such, as Lord Stern has noted – but of systems 
failure. Regulations, financial structures and 
incentives, technologies, cultural expectations 
and established learning agendas all condition 
continued lock-in to a model that presupposes 
the unsustainable consumption of cheap and 
abundant fossil fuels. 
Low carbon innovation in China is an issue of 
key global significance in this regard. This is not 
just because of the large and growing carbon 
footprint of the Chinese economy as a whole, 
but also because China’s spectacular social 
and economic growth represents a unique 
opportunity to develop and roll out low carbon 
innovations. China’s capacities in science and 
innovation are also improving rapidly, so that 
it is reasonable to expect that Chinese low 
carbon innovation will be of growing global 
significance in the coming decades. And, 
following the financial crash of 2008, it is clear 
that China’s growing geopolitical influence has 
entered a new phase, which will be a crucial 
determinant of global efforts to respond to 
climate change. 
This report explores the importance of one 
form of low carbon innovation that offers 
considerable opportunities both to China and 
the world, but that is usually overlooked: 
‘disruptive innovation’. The notion of disruptive 
innovation was originally developed by 
Harvard researcher Clayton Christensen and 
has subsequently been applied in many fields, 
including low carbon innovation. Disruptive 
innovation challenges many of our common 
assumptions about innovation; it produces 
cheaper, easier-to-use alternatives to existing 
products and services, which target previously 
ignored customers. Such innovations are often 
produced by non-traditional players, and 
sometimes they exploit existing technologies in 
novel contexts and combinations. 
This report follows a 2007 NESTA report that 
profiled eight disruptive low carbon innovators 
from the UK, and explores the particular 
importance of this type of innovation to 
China with seven case studies. These are the 
Chinese ‘Game-Changers’, each of which has 
developed a low carbon innovation that has 
the potential to make a significant contribution 
to emissions reductions and the move to a low 
carbon society. In five years time, five of these 
innovations could together be saving up to 
66 million tonnes of carbon dioxide per year, 
while the other two will be important players 
in markets that could have total savings of 
270 million tonnes of CO2 per year. These are 
equivalent to the greenhouse gas emissions 
of 25 million and 100 million Chinese homes 
respectively, or 4 per cent and 16 per cent of 
total Chinese emissions in 2006.
4Greater attention to this form of innovation 
alongside extant programmes of hi-tech 
innovation would capitalise on current Chinese 
strengths and so accelerate moves to a low 
carbon economy and society, while also 
incubating the world-beating Chinese low 
carbon firms of the future. It will also maximise 
the climate impact of the already-existing 
technologies that will have to deliver the vast 
majority of emissions reductions to 2050. 
Lastly, by demanding a definition of innovation 
that is much broader than high-technology 
alone, disruptive low carbon innovation 
highlights the need to consider the wider social 
and political aspects of innovation that are so 
crucial to its successful implementation.
Current policy – in China and many other 
countries – tends to focus on research and 
development for high-technology ‘solutions’. 
The innovations highlighted in this report 
instead suggest that waiting for ‘perfect’ 
technologies would be a mistake. A broader 
understanding of innovation would also be 
particularly compatible with the needs of 
developing countries such as China; these 
innovations are more appropriate to the 
Chinese domestic market and that of other 
developing countries. A greater focus on 
such technologies would help to engage all 
stakeholders, including the world’s poorest, 
in low carbon innovation. It would also 
overturn the assumption in vital international 
collaborations that developing countries can 
only follow the lead of developed nations. In 
collaboration with its partners, disruptive low 
carbon innovation represents an opportunity 
for China to set the agenda.
•	First, policy could create more 
opportunities for these types of 
innovation to develop and spread. The 
diversity of China’s provinces and the 
relatively devolved government structure 
could be a significant strength in incubating 
a wide range of experiments, with successful 
ones leading to broader support at higher 
tiers of government – a process that would 
match the pragmatic approach of the last 
three decades of economic ‘reform and 
opening up’. Current financial support and 
initiatives establishing ‘low carbon zones’ 
could also be opened to these forms of 
innovation, beyond the familiar focus on hi-
tech innovation and R&D.
•	Second, policymakers could provide the 
right kind of governance, that is, as an 
enabler rather than director or controller. 
This will require new ways for government, 
innovators and stakeholders to interact, 
regardless of their existing guanxi 
(connections or relationships). Refocusing 
of fiscal and other supports from ‘hi-tech’ 
to ‘innovative’ companies, more broadly 
defined, could also significantly help many 
innovative companies that are excluded 
under current definitions.
•	Third, policymakers could also exploit the 
opportunities of low carbon innovation 
policy to improve governance. Traditional 
modes of governance are seriously 
challenged by the need for wide social 
participation in the transition to a low carbon 
society. Building on China’s indigenous 
strengths for low-cost and low carbon 
innovation and encouraging widespread 
participation could help to develop 
governance in the medium term. 
•	Finally, policymakers both within and outside 
China (including the UK) could maximise 
the opportunities for intra-national and 
international learning by involving SMEs 
such as these in partnerships, rather than 
just academics and large multinational 
corporations. This will require establishment 
of new platforms for both formal and 
informal interactions on a regular basis 
that can in turn stimulate substantive 
international collaborations in innovation, 
not just R&D projects. 
By explicitly addressing these issues and 
developing its existing strengths in low carbon 
innovation, China could lead the global low 
carbon transition that we need in the next 40 
years.
Introducing the Game-Changers
GEI is a Chinese NGO that has set up a full low 
carbon agriculture system for poor farmers in 
the south-western province of Yunnan. There 
have been many national and international 
programmes to encourage the use of anaerobic 
biodigesters by Chinese farmers to produce 
methane from animal slurry that can then 
be used for cooking and heating. Many of 
these projects, however, have failed or have 
had only temporary effect because the use 
of the biodigester has not been successfully 
integrated into the farmers’ everyday practices. 
GEI has therefore established the necessary 
institutional mechanisms to make use of biogas 
socially sustainable, in the process also shifting 
these farms to organic agriculture with further 
emissions reductions.
Himin is one of China’s largest producers 
of solar thermal water tanks, a market that 
is in turn dominated globally by Chinese 
companies. The business strategy has been 
to produce low-cost solutions to energy and 
heating that directly attract customers and 
so do not depend upon government subsidy. 
In the process, Himin has transformed the 
local economy of its home town, Dezhou in 
Shandong province, with over 90 per cent 
of families now using solar thermal energy 
in the area and 30 per cent of the workforce 
in industries related to the sector. The real 
challenge for the future, says CEO and founder 
Huang Ming, is whether the company is ready 
for the continuing growth in demand over the 
next decades.
ISAW has a range of products that build 
on CEO Yuan Yijun’s scientific expertise to 
exploit ‘psychrometric’ principles, regarding 
the different physical and thermodynamic 
properties of vapour mixtures, to provide 
low-cost, relatively low-tech and low carbon 
alternatives to a range of processes that are 
usually extremely energy intensive, such as 
air-conditioning and solar desalination of salt 
water. These innovations have attracted the 
attention of the major Chinese real estate 
company, Vanke, and Masdar eco-city in the 
Persian Gulf. 
Lüyuan is a major manufacturer of electric 
bicycles and was the first Chinese company 
to develop an e-bike. The e-bike is a hugely 
popular form of transport in a country in which 
commuting distances are growing as people 
move to the burgeoning mega-cities but cars 
are too expensive and, in any case, face daily 
gridlock. 120 million e-bikes are estimated to 
be on China’s roads, and Lüyuan is a major 
player in this market. And with annual savings 
of about 1 tonne CO2e per year, this adds up to 
a huge overall saving in emissions, even before 
systemic effects of discouraging private car 
ownership are included.
Pearl Hydrogen is also targeting the e-bike 
sector, amongst its various products, but using 
its innovative, but low-cost and simplified, fuel 
cell technology. Recognising the extraordinary 
challenges associated with the familiar goal 
of a fuel cell vehicle that could compete with 
existing car models, CEO Brian Tian and team 
have been focusing on novel uses for their 
fuel cell, including providing back-up power to 
telecom base stations needing the guarantee 
of uninterrupted power supply (UPS). And in 
collaboration with an Italian partner, they have 
been busy creating a full energy system for 
their fuel cell bicycle that allows production 
of the hydrogen fuel from high pressure 
electrolysis of tap water in the user’s home. 
Shengchang Bioenergy is making high-
quality pellets from agricultural residues that 
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would otherwise simply be burned in the field, 
as well as the stoves and boilers to maximise 
the efficiency of combustion. By offering an 
attractive substitute for current coal burners, 
therefore, a double emissions reduction is 
provided. Furthermore, by positioning pelleting 
factories to service farmers within a short 20 
km distance, from whom the stalks and husks 
are also sourced, Shengchang is establishing a 
model of reliable and locally-sourced energy.
ZNHK (Beijing Sin-entech) offers a water 
purification system that allows the high-
temperature recycling of water in industrial 
processes. By keeping the water at elevated 
temperatures, energy that is normally wasted 
through cooling and reheating the water is 
saved, while the purity of the filtered water 
meets the highest national standards. And by 
allowing for efficient water recycling, the water 
demands of the industrial processes are also 
reduced. Cost savings from reduced energy and 
water use typically allow recovery of the capital 
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Part 1: The case for disruptive low carbon innovation in 
China 
1.1 Climate change, low carbon 
innovation and the crucial case of China
As we enter the new decade, it is clear that 
we are living in a period of tectonic social 
upheaval. Three important trends can be 
identified that converge in an issue of singular 
global significance: low carbon innovation in 
China. First, climate change remains the single 
greatest global challenge, regardless of the 
current overheating of controversies about 
the science, demanding an unprecedented 
transformation of global socio-economic 
activity towards low carbon social systems. 
Indeed, global heating (as James Lovelock 
more bluntly describes it) is merely one part of 
a broader ecological crisis that demands urgent 
but long-term action.1 
Secondly, the rise of China is entering a 
new phase in which its global effects are 
becoming increasingly apparent. This has 
been particularly accelerated by the Great 
Crash of 2008 and its continuing fall-out 
for the developed economies and their 
geopolitical dominance, especially the US. 
Chinese demands will thus progressively 
shape geopolitical debates, regulations and 
institutions. As the COP15 meeting of the 
UNFCCC in Copenhagen last December 
demonstrated, this is already the case regarding 
climate change. And, indeed, China is also 
pivotal regarding this global challenge. It is 
not simply that China’s absolute emissions 
have overtaken the US to become the largest 
in the world and are continuing to grow at an 
extraordinary pace. But also, the incredible 
rate of economic growth, investment and 
social change in China provides an unparalleled 
opportunity to develop and introduce systems-
changing low carbon innovations. As a huge 
country facing severe environmental pressures 
of its own, which will be hugely exacerbated 
by runaway warming, China also has plenty of 
incentive to tackle these issues.
In doing so, China, like all countries, will need 
to develop significant low carbon innovation, 
which brings us to the third major trend. New 
poles of excellence in science and innovation 
(S&I) are rising around the world, transforming 
the global geography of the globalised 
knowledge economy.2 Furthermore, processes 
of innovation are themselves changing with 
this globalisation of innovation, becoming 
more mobile, dispersed but inter-related.3 
China is a principal agent and beneficiary 
of these changes, with numerous metrics of 
science and innovation – international peer-
reviewed papers, graduate and post-graduate 
student numbers, expenditure on R&D in both 
public and private sectors, patents, major 
R&D labs of both domestic and multinational 
corporations etc. – growing at an extraordinary 
pace. Furthermore, these improvements are 
the result of intense policy efforts to build an 
‘innovation-based economy’ by 2020 with 
globally competitive capacities for ‘indigenous 
innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin).4 There is every 
reason, therefore, to expect that Chinese 
innovation capacities will continue to grow and 
that China will make major contributions to a 
global low carbon transition.
1.2 From silver bullets to systems 
transition
Given the sheer size of China, however, many 
of these S&I statistics are extremely difficult 
to interpret as they may still be small when 
converted into relative figures or may conceal 
‘long tails’ of weak performance.5 It must not 
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be forgotten that China is still a developing 
country. Indeed, just as the US economy (let 
alone its military) continues overwhelmingly 
to dominate all other countries and is still over 
twice the size of China’s with a population 
one-fifth as big, caution is needed not to 
exaggerate the current strength of China’s 
science and innovation. 
Moreover, ‘innovation’ is much more than is 
captured in these statistics and other crucial 
elements of a dynamic innovation system 
are developing more slowly in China. In 
particular, hi-tech innovation capacities, while 
undoubtedly improving, are still comparatively 
modest in most sectors.6 Despite (or rather, 
precisely because of) these modest capacities, 
China’s current policy regarding low carbon 
innovation focuses squarely on hi-tech 
innovation. To be sure, this focus is achieving 
some significant successes, as in China’s 
global solar PV companies or its leading coal 
combustion technologies, such as ultra-super-
critical combustion or gasification (IGCC 
– integrated gasification combined cycle). 
But these alone, even where they are widely 
adopted (and over 90 per cent of Chinese PV is 
currently exported), will be unable to produce 
the wholesale transition to low carbon systems 
that is needed.7 
Indeed, the biggest problem with focusing on 
high-technology is not whether or not China 
has the capacity for such innovation, important 
though this is (see below). Dealing with climate 
change demands not just a marginal reduction 
of GHG emissions through energy efficiency 
improvements, but profound changes in 
every aspect of day-to-day life and the 
socio-economic systems that underpin these. 
Innovation is undoubtedly needed to produce 
these changes, but this cannot simply be the 
introduction of high-technology ‘solutions’. 
Rather, the nature and scale of the challenge 
of the low carbon transition – and over a single 
generation – demands action and policy that 
responds to a much broader understanding 
of the innovation process than hi-tech 
improvements alone.
This perspective highlights how technological 
change occurs in inextricable parallel with 
social change. Technologies are only adopted 
where there are the social conditions to 
be able to use them, and they are altered 
and shaped in this process. Conversely, 
technologies introduce new capabilities to 
social action, thereby transforming social norms 
and practices. Innovation is thus always a 
matter of messy and complex socio-technical 
change. A great deal of important innovation 
– involving new institutions or social practices, 
the translation of existing technologies to 
novel social contexts or unusual combinations 
of existing technologies – is thus ignored 
by focusing on the cutting-edge of high-
technology alone. Yet these alternative forms 
of innovation will be at least as crucial in a 
low carbon transition. Indeed, “an important 
general pattern in transition processes… is 
that the course of a transition is shaped to a 
considerable extent by the vicissitudes of the 
development of novelties in their early phases 
when most actors in a system tend to see them 
as irrelevant”.8 The innovations that will shape 
the low carbon transition are thus most likely 
to emerge from unexpected, indeed apparently 
unpromising, sources.
1.3 Disruptive low carbon innovation 
is an overlooked opportunity for China 
(and the world)
In this context, one particular form of 
innovation that may be particularly relevant 
for low carbon systems change is ‘disruptive’ 
innovation. As originally developed by Clayton 
Christensen and applied to low carbon 
innovation by a previous NESTA report, this 
involves “cheaper, easier-to-use alternatives to 
existing products or services often produced 
by non-traditional players that target 
previously ignored customers” and/or use in 
novel contexts and combinations.9 Disruptive 
innovation is thus primarily characterised 
by a social redefinition of a technology, as 
opposed to improvement of the technology 
along established trajectories, and is thus 
an issue that is altogether different from 
whether the innovation incorporates high- 
or low-technology. The point is rather that, 
in the first instance at least, the disruptive 
innovation will likely offer lower than cutting 
edge functionality, according to established 
definitions, but for different uses and to 
neglected customers. Disruptive innovation 
thus exemplifies how conflating innovation 
with high-technology is something of a ‘red 
herring’, albeit one with potentially harmful 
consequences. 
The ‘disruptive’ aspect of these innovations 
refers to their (potential) effects on established 
firms and even industrial political economies 
and socio-technical systems. While such 
social redefinition of technology often seems 
unremarkable to start with, in setting off on 
an alternative path it possesses the potential 
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in the medium-term to challenge the existing 
business models and become dominant. This 
is so even where such disruptive innovators 
may never catch up with the technological 
functionality offered by incumbent firms 
pursuing technological improvements along 
established innovation trajectories. 
Such a change of innovation trajectories is 
precisely what is needed for a low carbon 
systems transition and the importance of 
‘small beginnings’ to such profound socio-
technical change also resonates strongly with 
disruptive innovation. This is not to argue that 
low carbon innovation and systems transition 
are themselves synonymous with disruptive 
innovation. Indeed, much important low carbon 
innovation is precisely the opposite, based 
on incremental but, in aggregate, significant 
improvements along established trajectories. 
Rather, disruptive innovation is an important, 
but generally overlooked, element of the route 
to the goal of a low carbon systems transition, 
and one moreover with particular relevance to 
China.
First, regarding disruptive low carbon 
innovation per se, the exceptionally tight time 
constraints for the needed low carbon systems 
transition entails that “only the low-carbon 
technologies that are already known can make 
a significant contribution to meeting the 2050 
targets. They are already in the marketplace, 
close to it or close to being demonstrated 
at scale.”10 In short, we must do the best 
with what we have. But from the perspective 
of disruptive innovation, which makes use 
of just such established technologies, this 
maximisation of climate impact need not be 
limited to current uses and familiar sectoral 
definitions of these technologies. Rather, 
disruptive innovation offers a potential route 
to substantial improvements in the societal 
impact of low carbon technologies that is 
not dependent on their radical technological 
upgrade.
This argument becomes even more important 
in the case of China. This is not just because 
China’s capacities for hi-tech low carbon 
innovation are not yet fully developed, as 
demonstrated by the continuing dominance 
of intellectual property ownership of major 
low carbon technologies by OECD-based 
companies.11 But also because, on the 
other hand, Chinese companies are already 
transforming global competition through their 
low-cost disruptive innovations, as business 
scholars Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson have 
shown.12 
For instance, Haier has developed a range of 
fridges with relatively low-tech adaptations 
that serve a variety of niche, but highly 
profitable, markets, including student rooms 
(doubling up as desks) and wine collectors. 
Similarly, China International Marine Containers 
Group (CIMC) has achieved unrivalled global 
dominance in their industry through a low-cost 
strategy. Other examples of successful low-
cost disruptive innovators include car company 
Chery, piano maker Pearl River, consumer 
electronics maker TCL, computer company 
Dawning, port equipment manufacturer ZPMC, 
universal joint manufacturer Wanxian etc. The 
list goes on and on.
While these and other examples listed by 
Zeng and Williamson are not low carbon 
innovators (at least not in all cases and not 
yet), high profile examples of the latter are 
also increasingly apparent. BYD is using its 
global leadership in battery manufacturing and 
technology to develop low-cost electric cars 
and has won the attention (and investment!) 
of legendary investor, Warren Buffett. Himin 
Group, which we profile in more detail 
here, is now a global leader in solar thermal 
technology, a sector dominated as a whole by 
Chinese companies. But a large and growing 
number of small companies are emerging 
that are not just selling cheap versions of 
familiar low carbon technologies, but are 
developing innovative low-cost combinations 
or applications of technologies and the social 
or institutional innovations these require. 
These initiatives have the potential to disrupt 
established business models and industrial 
boundaries in ways that introduce the crucial 
element of discontinuity needed for broader 
systems transitions. By focusing on low-cost 
products and services for the Chinese market, 
this also has the advantage of developing 
technologies that are appropriate not only 
for Chinese society but for other developing 
countries worldwide. And with over 70 per 
cent of total costs of abatement and hence low 
carbon investment to 2050 likely to come from 
developing countries, servicing this market 
would also be to focus on the major business 
opportunity, not merely to make a virtue of 
necessity by targeting secondary sources of 
demand.13 
A policy that effectively supports the existing 
Chinese competitive strength of disruptive 
low carbon innovation would also expedite 
a Chinese low carbon systems transition, 
responding to the unprecedented timescale. 
Conversely, banking primarily on the 
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improvement of hi-tech innovation capacities 
alone will incur substantial (and climatically 
consequential) delays, given the need to 
develop institutional, social and cultural 
conditions that are hard to short-circuit. 
Similarly, incorporating disruptive low carbon 
innovation into policy could also support a 
broader public redefinition of low carbon, 
away from its current identification with 
expensive equipment. This tends to embed 
a perceived opposition between low carbon 
innovation and socio-economic development, 
and hence to slow down the former, while it 
is clear that a low carbon shift must attend to 
both. China cannot and must not be forced to 
choose between ‘environment’ and ‘economy’, 
and disruptive low carbon innovation is an 
important way to sidestep this false choice.
Finally, disruptive innovation offers the most 
plausible route to world-beating companies, 
while simply pursuing existing leaders 
directly through hi-tech improvements along 
established pathways sets up a perpetual game 
of ‘catch-up’. Paradoxically, therefore, globally 
competitive hi-tech companies may be more 
effectively fostered by sponsoring disruptive 
low-cost innovations than by focusing on 
high-technology itself. For instance, there 
is “not a single example in the history of 
technological innovation in the disk drive 
industry of an entrant firm leading the industry 
or securing a viable market position with a 
sustaining [non-disruptive] innovation”.14 
The competitive ‘attacker’s advantage’ of 
these entrant companies was not regarding 
technology itself but in “the relative flexibility 
of successful established firms versus entrant 
firms to change strategies and cost structures, 
not technologies” so that the latter can 
“disrupt or redefine the level, rate and direction 
of progress in an established technological 
trajectory”. This has significant implications for 
national economic growth as much as it does 
for business strategy, and this, in turn, is crucial 
for China’s low carbon shift.
1.4 Low carbon challenges are 
significantly different in China 
China is certainly to be applauded for its 
efforts regarding mitigation; its continuing 
and seemingly inescapable dependence 
on coal and the unstoppable growth of its 
car market – overtaking the US in 2009 to 
become the largest in the world – being 
the indelible black marks against it. Energy 
efficiency has improved significantly in recent 
years, major reforestation and afforestation 
projects continue and the new commitments 
to a further 40-45 per cent improvement in 
emissions/GDP (as opposed to energy/GDP) 
intensity between 2005-2020 will be a major 
achievement if they are met. 
Similarly, policy and institutional 
rearrangements, with the promotion of 
environmental protection to ministerial level 
in 2008, a climate change White Paper in the 
same year and the establishment of a National 
Leading group on climate change in 2007 and 
a National Energy Commission super-ministry 
in 2010, both chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao, 
show the importance the central government 
is attaching to these issues. Achievements in 
renewable energy are also impressive, backed 
by the Renewable Energy Law, which aims 
for 16 per cent renewable energy in 2020. 
For instance, the growth of the wind sector is 
simply staggering, heading for 100MW by 2020 
or double total global capacity only a few years 
back, while big hydropower is the largest in the 
world and growing (more than doubling from 
142GW or 14.3 per cent of total electricity in 
2008 to 300GW or 21.2 per cent in 2020).15 
A significant percentage (about 40 per cent) 
of China’s 2008-9 post-crash fiscal stimulus 
of RMB 4 trillion (US$ 580 billion) was also 
directed to ‘green sectors’.16 
Yet there remains widespread presumption, 
amongst policymakers, business and 
citizens alike, that low carbon innovation is 
synonymous with hi-tech solutions to problems 
of fossil fuel inefficiency. This is undoubtedly 
partly due to engrained conceptual associations 
between technological sophistication and 
geopolitical status. China is not simply 
rising passively, but rather as the result of a 
concerted national project. In this context, 
the identification of innovation, economic 
growth and global power with high-technology 
enshrines the latter as the goal in itself. 
That disruptive innovation may be, counter-
intuitively, a more direct route to these goals 
than focusing on high-technology itself is thus 
one of the most important arguments in its 
favour in the Chinese policy context.
In short, China’s disruptive low carbon 
innovators are key national assets that need 
significantly greater support from policy. How 
should they be supported and what form 
should this support take? The original 2007 
report contains numerous insights regarding 
this question and we refer our readers to it, as 
these lessons remain as cogent and pertinent 
as ever in their original formulation.17 But, 
14. Christensen, C. (1997) 
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focusing on the UK and on British examples, 
the original report does not respond to the 
significantly different context and challenges 
regarding low carbon innovation in China; 
differences that reflect China’s exceptional 
rates of urbanisation and industrialisation, its 
socio-economic structure, political constitution 
and governance institutions and distinctive and 
ancient cultural history. Nor does it explore the 
argument that disruptive low carbon innovation 
may be particularly important for developing 
countries such as China. These are the tasks of 
this report.
We have already encountered some of the 
ways in which the Chinese context alters the 
argument regarding disruptive low carbon 
innovation. First, there is the issue of current 
innovation and absorptive capacities, especially 
regarding hi-tech innovation. These could be 
largely taken for granted in the UK report (at 
least in those industries where the UK has 
significant presence), but this is not the case 
when moving to China. Indeed, secondly, 
developing hi-tech innovation capacity is 
a matter of earnest concern in the Chinese 
context, due to its connection with the 
preeminent national priority of socio-economic 
development, as just discussed. Thirdly, then, 
issues of development must be placed at the 
very heart of discussion about low carbon 
innovation in China, while they are often 
overlooked or tacitly presumed in developed 
country debates. Similarly, the international 
dimensions of low carbon innovation, including 
international collaboration, are also more 
transparently important in China – though they 
undoubtedly matter in the UK too.
Last, and by no means least, the very term 
‘disruptive’ innovation needs to be translated 
sensitively given strong negative connotations 
of the standalone word ‘disruptive’ that are 
absent in English. In the Chinese game ‘Go’, 
a single unexceptional move may alter the 
direction of play such that it turns out to 
switch the game in a player’s favour, no matter 
the odds against him when it is played.18 
This move is described as poju (破局) or 
‘game-changing’. In what follows, we present 
the lessons from seven Chinese low carbon 
game-changers in the hope that it will catalyze 
some even bigger changes towards low carbon 
systems both in China and beyond.
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Part 2: Lessons from China for low carbon innovation 
2.1 Follow existing opportunities, don’t 
wait for ‘perfect’ technologies
Chinese water wheels
Many futuristic visions of a perfectly 
sustainable economy have evoked the idea 
of one based on hydrogen, with drinkable 
water dripping from your car’s exhaust 
pipe. Such futures conjure up images of 
hyper-modern, gleaming cars and buildings, 
reflecting the blinding sun of the clear, blue 
sky. An unassuming industrial hanger in south 
Shanghai, reached after a long smoggy drive 
on the city’s congested highways, thus seems 
an unlikely birthplace for this hydro-topia. 
Pearl Hydrogen, however, is tackling some of 
the most enduring problems of the hydrogen 
economy head-on – or rather through the back 
door.
Across the world, and for many years, there has 
been a great deal of research and commercial 
effort expended on the development of fuel 
cells. The usual goal is to test various types 
of fuel-stack, electrolytes and catalysts in 
order to create a fuel cell that has some 
chance of meeting power demands of existing 
technologies in a way that is economically 
viable – the quintessential challenge being a 
fuel-cell vehicle (FCV). Yet this goal remains 
elusive, even before the massive challenge 
of construction of the associated hydrogen 
infrastructure is considered. As a result, many 
have written hydrogen off for a low carbon 
transition, both for a near-term transition and 
even in the long term.
Perceiving these problems, however, Pearl 
set out to tackle the problem in the opposite 
direction, seeking out profitable opportunities 
for applications of their fuel cell. Finding 
such opportunities certainly depended upon 
technological development, but not in terms 
of improved functionality along established 
trajectories. Rather, the goal was the creation 
of an efficient low-cost fuel cell that could 
service power needs that had been overlooked 
in the past. The key here was the core 
technology, developed by CEO Brian Tian from 
three years of work at another Chinese fuel cell 
company: a catalysis-coated membrane. Setting 
out on his own in 2006, Brian noted that the 
fuel stack could be hugely simplified with this 
membrane by using the same channels both 
to provide air needed for the reaction and to 
cool the fuel stack. This air-cooled fuel cell 
could then dispense with the usual water-
cooling apparatus, which added considerable 
bulk, expense and accessory energy costs. 
Moreover, it transpired that this lower-cost fuel 
cell remained highly efficient. By simplifying 
the technology in this way, hitherto neglected 
opportunities for fuel cells opened up.
In particular, following market research 
within China, three opportunities presented 
themselves: a fuel cell bicycle and niche 
transportation (for example, forklift trucks, 
golf carts, small boats); back-up emergency 
generators providing uninterrupted power 
supply (UPS); and a mobile or hand-held power 
source. In each case, Pearl has developed fuel 
cells of sufficient power (ranging from 200W 
for the electric bicycle up to a 10kW stack, due 
out this year) for the relevant application and 
has incorporated these into products, such as 
the bicycle or the hand-held power source, 
through collaboration with other companies 
and consultation with users, that are attractive 
to their target markets.
The strategy also appears to be working. 
The fuel cell bicycle (called Green Angel and 
developed with Chinese bicycle company 
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Celimo – whose name means ‘horse that 
goes for 1,000 miles’) was demonstrated at 
Zaragoza International Expo in 2008, and is 
now on sale in China and in Europe. Pearl also 
attracted the attention of an Italian company 
listed on London’s AIM stock exchange, Acta, 
that produces a high-pressure electrolyser. 
Combining forces, the two companies are 
developing a full-system solution, with home 
generation of the hydrogen fuel source 
through electrolysis of tap water. Furthermore, 
future plans are to make this electrolyser run 
on solar power, closing the circle to make a 
fully renewable energy mobility option.
Similarly, regarding the UPS fuel cells, contracts 
have been signed, via private sub-contractors, 
with major Chinese telecom SOEs and other 
telecom substations across south east Asia, 
based on their 5kW stacks showing competitive 
pricing and reliability. Demonstration plants 
will be put into operation in 2010. The hand-
held mobile power source is also now on sale, 
providing a low-cost and low carbon option 
for power that could serve numerous markets, 
including in remote areas of China. Finally, 
through collaboration with a team at Imperial 
College, London, Pearl is also involved in the 
development of a racing car for the Formula 
Zero race, providing the fuel cell on which the 
car runs. By building up the strength of their 
technology via the opportunities for profitable 
learning based on their low-cost fuel cell, Pearl 
may yet create the FCV of so many dreams.
Standing innovation back on its feet
Pearl’s innovation certainly involves – indeed, 
depends upon – technological development 
but it has not been led by a vision that 
innovation amounts to technology alone. 
Unfortunately, this remains the dominant 
view, including in policy circles, which thereby 
focus almost entirely on advances at the 
cutting-edge of high-technology to the 
neglect of all other forms of innovation. As the 
predecessor to this report made clear, narrowly 
defining innovation as high-technology 
alone is associated with a pipeline or ‘linear’ 
model that displays “flawed but ingrained 
assumptions about the relationship between 
science, technology and innovation”, in which 
science leads to technologies which are in turn 
successfully commercialised as innovations.19 
Such a model discounts many crucial factors 
in innovation and ignores many areas in which 
innovation occurs. In particular, it overlooks 
the irreducible social dimensions of innovation 
processes, where technologies are shaped 
and their uses defined within their diverse 
social contexts. Much innovation thus involves 
established technologies being used in novel 
ways or in novel combinations that serve (and 
create) particular social needs and demands, 
as well as much low- or medium-technology 
innovation. In these circumstances, it is the 
social, institutional and policy contexts of 
innovation that are at play – and it is just these 
factors, rather than technological challenges, 
that often also explain the failure of new 
technologies to be taken up and to flourish 
beyond their original niches.
Focusing only on the one-dimensional 
question of technological development 
also systematically excludes consideration 
of social factors in innovation processes. 
Thus innovation is generally understood in 
terms of new technologies fitting into pre-
existing social systems, which are simply 
taken as given. Yet the mutual interaction of 
technological and social change means that 
such a perspective is not merely incomplete, 
but likely to be erroneous in any given case. 
The successful integration of new technology 
will almost certainly require adaptation and 
accommodation from the social conditions 
upon which it depends. Ignoring the socio-
technical system, therefore, is a recipe for 
innovation failure.
This is evidently a particularly important 
problem for low carbon innovation and policy. 
For not only is a profound transformation of 
socio-technical systems required but there is 
also exceptional time pressure. There is thus 
simply no time for policymakers to discover 
that their favoured high-technology low 
carbon projects have failed for these reasons. 
The fuel cell vehicle is a classic example, but 
it is by no means alone. Carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) (both for electricity generation 
and for industrial plants), GM crops to tackle 
mitigation and adaptation, biofuels (especially 
2nd generation), nuclear power and even 
geoengineering are all (or dependent upon) 
high-technologies that proponents generally 
hope will tackle global warming without the 
need for significant social and institutional 
change. 
This is certainly not to argue that such 
technologies should themselves be simply 
discounted. For instance, given the 
overwhelming dependence of the Chinese grid 
on coal (but also India and increasingly the 
US and the EU as well), CCS would seem to 
be absolutely necessary in the medium-term 
for significant GHG emission reductions. But 
focusing on technology, as if it can simply be 
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slotted into existing socio-technical systems 
without innovation in those social and 
institutional contexts themselves, imposes 
significant costs and delays on low carbon 
innovation, while also neglecting the significant 
opportunities for (possibly profound) socio-
technical change that can occur by focusing on 
what can be done with existing technologies 
used in novel ways and contexts.
As Pearl demonstrates, this shift away from 
conflating innovation and high-technology 
alone is also especially compatible with the 
needs of a developing country such as China. 
In particular, focusing innovation (including 
the technological development this involves) 
on the development of low cost alternatives 
with strong, if not revolutionary, levels of 
functionality, provides the opportunity for 
these innovators to continue to strengthen 
their innovative capabilities. This is crucially 
dependent upon offering products that are 
economically attainable for their potential 
Chinese market, while also developing 
these products in ways that are relevant or 
appropriate technologies for China and other 
developing countries rather than for developed 
ones. It also builds on the current strengths 
of multiple Chinese companies, rather than 
demanding they tackle hi-tech innovation 
for which many are not yet equipped. And by 
exploiting existing market opportunities it is 
also a route that is relatively self-supporting 
and so does not have to wait for the significant 
financial and policy support on which many hi-
tech low carbon innovations do depend. 
Dezhou dynamism
There is perhaps no greater vision of success 
of this low-cost strategy than Himin Group 
and its domination of the Chinese market for 
the humble array of tubes that is the solar 
water heater. Established in the early 1990s 
by founder and CEO Huang Ming, Himin has 
grown to be a hugely profitable business with 
annual profits of RMB 68 million (£7 million) 
in 2007. Chinese companies increasingly 
dominate the global market for solar water 
heaters, and Himin is amongst the biggest 
companies, putting Huang Ming in the Sunday 
Times world’s top 100 green rich list in 2009. 
Its massive Sun-Moon Mansion in Solar Valley 
is entirely heated by the solar thermal and solar 
PV building materials that cover its roof and 
walls. The impressive effect is redoubled once 
you remember you are in an unexceptional city 
that few have heard of in the West, albeit a city 
of 5.6 million. The city of Dezhou, two hours 
south of Beijing by train in the coastal province 
of Shandong, however, itself bears the marks 
of Himin’s success. Solar thermal water tanks 
are increasingly common across China, but in 
Dezhou they are ubiquitous, with more than 
90 per cent of families now using solar thermal 
tanks. And the solar thermal business and 
associated industries is an increasingly central 
part of the local economy, employing 800,000 
people or 30 per cent of the local workforce.
Huang started the company following a 
decade of working as a research fellow in an 
institute of the Ministry of Mineral Resources 
studying petroleum drilling. Confronted by the 
evidence of a looming energy crisis and the 
big environmental problems associated with 
fossil fuels, he determined that he had to do 
something, his mission being to “give back 
the blue sky and the white clouds to the next 
generation”. He therefore set up a company, 
initially under the name of his research 
institution, to develop solar thermal heaters in 
1992.
Lacking any policy support, the only viable 
strategy was to rely on customers, finding an 
existing opportunity for a profitable business. 
Huang thus had to work with customers 
to develop products attractive to them, 
servicing their needs and at low cost. The 
latter was particularly important, given that 
cost effectiveness, including reliability of the 
technology, was the priority for the company’s 
first customers of individual house-holders. 
This involved some technological development 
of its own, with existing foreign technologies 
unsuitable and too expensive for this nascent 
Chinese market. Installation of the heaters was 
also offered as standard inclusion in the price. 
As a result, a solar water heater was created 
that could last 20+ years and for which savings 
from reduced energy costs (i.e. zero) would 
reimburse the initial capital outlay in about 5.5 
years, with ‘free’ heating thereafter.20 
Building on the successes of sales within 
Dezhou and across Shandong, Himin 
continued to develop a variety of products 
suitable for different climates (for example, 
able to withstand the cold temperatures of 
winter) and different building or user types. 
Larger customers have also been targeted, 
including real estate companies, hotels and 
public buildings, such as hospitals. Himin has 
also established its own real estate company. 
Novel applications of solar thermal technology 
have been developed, creating full central 
heating systems that use intelligent electronic 
controls, rather than just providing hot water, 








To be sure, as Himin has grown, the extent of 
government support has also grown, and from 
all levels of government: municipal, provincial 
and central. For instance, rebates have been 
offered to customers for the purchase of 
solar thermal units, encouraging demand, 
while buildings over eight storeys are also 
mandated to fit them during construction. 
Similarly, governmental support for R&D 
projects has been secured. Yet at only 3-5 
per cent of expenditure on capacity building 
within the company, Himin’s strategy is still 
not dependent upon government support, 
with strong market demand, particularly in the 
‘home’ market of Shandong province. 
Indeed, Huang’s commitment to a strategy 
that is not reliant on government is such that 
he takes an unusually positive and counter-
intuitive line on the seemingly disappointing 
modesty of what was achieved at the UNFCCC’s 
Copenhagen conference. A ‘successful’ 
conference, he argues, would only have bred 
complacency that would have undermined 
low carbon efforts, while deepening the 
mistaken presumption that governments can 
effect a low carbon transition. Conversely, a 
‘failure’ keeps up the necessary pressure on 
the kind of bottom-up ventures that will in 
fact create a low carbon society. “Where was 
the international agreement underpinning 
the global success of mobile phones and their 
transformation of the economy?” he asks 
rhetorically.
2.2 Enable new relations
Scaling Snow Mountain
A consistent theme of the UK The Disrupters21 
report by NESTA was that low carbon 
innovation is not the sole preserve of large 
companies with strong R&D facilities. Rather 
a diversity of institutions and agencies are 
capable of introducing potentially significant 
disruptive innovations, including regarding the 
kind of institution itself. Baywind, for instance, 
was profiled not merely as a wind farm (hence 
‘low carbon’), but as one that is cooperatively 
owned, hence a disruptive innovation with 
the potential of stimulating the spread of 
further cooperatives across the UK, taking on 
responsibility for their own devolved energy 
needs and creating a distributed power system 
in the process.
Such institutional or relational innovations 
are equally crucial in the case of Chinese low 
carbon innovation, but with an added and 
essential twist. As GEI’s work in Yunnan shows, 
establishing new relations can also unlock 
potential for socio-economic development. 
GEI itself is something of an institutional 
innovation. Founded in 2004, GEI (Global 
Environment Institute) is one of the growing 
number of Chinese environmental ‘NGOs’, 
a term that is an inexact translation of 
the Western concept as all NGOs must be 
registered with the government. Similarly, 
unlike many Western NGOs, GEI is not just a 
pressure group or policy think-tank. Rather, the 
particular focus of GEI is “on the use of market-
based solutions to environmental problems 
to achieve sustainable development” with 
‘development’, not just ‘sustainability’, as a key 
concern. Their work thus incorporates direct 
involvement and/or consultancy regarding 
development-related low carbon projects.
This has produced some considerable low 
carbon innovation, building the conditions 
for low carbon growth even in the poorest 
parts of the country. While these areas are 
highly unlikely to have the GHG emissions 
of industrial and urban areas (even average 
Chinese per capita emissions remain under 
one half of the UK’s and about one fifth of 
the US’s) and such emissions as are incurred 
relate largely to basic subsistence rather than 
consumerist lifestyles, bringing low carbon 
innovations to these areas allows them to 
move towards development along low carbon 
pathways, rather than first embedding high-
carbon systems and then trying to escape 
them.
In this context of relatively (or even absolutely) 
poor rural farmers, the unsuitability of 
expensive, cutting-edge hi-tech modes of 
innovation is transparent. Accordingly, GEI has 
worked on bringing low carbon technologies 
to poor parts of China using a significantly 
different model, involving the simultaneous 
development of new interventions, both 
technological and social, at multiple levels 
that unlocks the potential for broader systems 
change. Such complete systems change is 
also particularly important in the context of 
poor and hence risk-averse individual farmers, 
providing comprehensive viable alternatives 
that do not demand that they change their 
habitual practices on the wishful promise that a 
better world awaits if only they took the leap. 
As a result, such development-relevant low 
carbon innovation has to involve prodigious 
efforts involving multiple sites of both 
technological and institutional innovation.
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 A striking example is provided by GEI’s work 
in Lijiang in the south-western province of 
Yunnan. This has incorporated not only the 
introduction of biogas digesters, tailored to 
local needs, that reduce the carbon footprint of 
rural households, but also: the shift to organic 
agriculture using the slurry from the digesters; 
the creation of cooperatives to increase access 
to finance; and a further corporation acting 
as centralised merchant to the big markets on 
the east coast. Each of these has been in tight 
interdependency with the others – attempts 
simply to introduce the low carbon technology 
would have foundered without the wider social 
innovations on which it has depended.
This is not because the technology itself 
provides little rationale for farmers to change. 
Biogas digesters have significant advantages, 
both for the farmer users and regarding 
GHG emissions. By concentrating slurry in a 
single place and an anaerobic environment (a 
‘biogas digester’), methane production can be 
maximised and the gas collected and used to 
service the family’s heating and cooking needs 
in an effectively inexhaustible and free supply 
of a natural resource that is otherwise wasted. 
Combustion of the gas is also much cleaner 
than conventional coal or wood burning, 
significantly improving the living environment; 
a major benefit especially for women and 
children. Regarding emissions, methane is 
also a GHG that is approximately 23 times 
more potent than CO2. Hence by burning the 
methane rather than simply releasing it and 
substituting for coal or wood, including the 
mining and transport and deforestation these 
respectively entail, the overall carbon footprint 
of the household is significantly reduced. 
But adopting any technology is a risk, and 
one that many farmers feel they cannot 
afford to take lest they find themselves 
in a worse position than before. After all, 
technologies break down or do not work as 
planned in the first place. The technology may 
also be incompatible with local conditions 
and practices, or have negative unforeseen 
consequences in a particular social context. 
In its work in Lijiang, GEI has had to tackle 
just such complex and multi-dimensional 
challenges. First, it secured financial assistance, 
including from an American aid fund, for 
introduction of biogas digesters. Buying 
digesters from a Hunan company, it then 
set about adapting them to local needs. The 
primary concern regarding choice of digester 
is one of gas capacity, based on how many 
people and for what purpose the gas will be 
used. A digester volume of 1m3 can produce 
0.15-0.3m3 gas per day, depending on 
temperatures (the higher the better), so that a 
10m3 digester is usually big enough to service 
the daily needs of a household of 3-4 people. 
This depends on local practices, however, 
including cooking habits. For instance, slow 
cooking for long periods by Beijing farmers, as 
opposed to the quick cooking of Tibetan meals, 
or the cooking of slops for pigs adds to the 
demand for gas. 
Other technological choices are also affected 
by local circumstances. Hence digesters in cold 
climates, like Tibet, have to be buried deep in 
the ground if the gas production is not to drop 
too low. The choice of digester technology, 
of which there are at least four main types, is 
also a matter of local preference. In the case 
of Lijiang, a ‘floating drum’ digester with a 
separate gas storage tank was chosen in favour 
of the more common ‘hydraulic pressured’ 
digester on the basis that the latter demanded 
laborious and dirty work to empty it every three 
to four months; a task that was understandably 
unpopular with the farmers. By burying the 
digester directly underneath the pig sties, slurry 
could also be drained directly into the digester, 
though this evidently demanded space that not 
all farmers had. 
Finally, the financial costs of introducing 
digesters are also borne by different parties 
in different parts of China. In the Lijiang 
case, half the cost was paid by the Lijiang 
local government, half demanded from 
farmers. Asking for outlay from the farmers 
themselves thus required the introduction of 
technology the farmers took to be reliable 
and economically beneficial. Tailoring the 
technology to local needs in the ways just 
discussed tackled the former, but the latter 
involved a further innovation: encouraging 
a shift to organic agriculture of lucrative 
vegetable crops, using the slurry from the 
digester.22 As organic agriculture is itself a low 
carbon innovation, reducing the use of fossil 
fuel-based fertilisers that release N2O, a GHG 
approximately 300 times as potent as CO2 that 
accounts for up to 9 per cent of total emissions 
in China, this also served to increase the low 
carbon impact of GEI’s innovation.23 
This shift, however, itself entailed 
transformation of both agricultural practices 
and institutions. Regarding institutions, GEI 
facilitated the creation of new corporate bodies 
that served three purposes; what GEI calls 
its ‘three-in-one’ model.24 First, it unlocked 
access to bank loans needed for the building 
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of greenhouses and other equipment. This 
took the form of at least six farmers joining 
forces in a rural credit cooperative, so that 
any one of them had five others offering a 
guarantee for their loan; the demand of the 
banks for lending. But even where the farming 
infrastructure for organic agriculture could 
be financed, individual farmers could not 
produce enough to secure steady access to the 
wholesale markets for their organic vegetables 
that exist only far away in the big coastal cities, 
like Beijing or Guangzhou. This, in turn, made 
returns for the farmers too unpredictable to 
make the shift to organic agriculture viable. 
Accordingly, two cooperatives were established 
to aggregate produce and a private share-
holding company, the Snow Mountain Organic 
Corporation, was established to centralise 
sales efforts of the organic produce. The two 
cooperatives contract with Snow Mountain, 
which thereby connects these remote farmers 
to the organic vegetable markets and provides 
a source of sufficient and stable demand. 
Regarding agricultural practices, before being 
introduced to the idea by GEI, the farmers 
had not even heard of organic agriculture, 
let alone knew how to do it. The final piece 
of the jigsaw was thus consultancy – paid for 
by Snow Mountain – with experts familiar 
with local conditions from nearby Yunnan 
Agricultural University to train farmers in 
organic agriculture, including the appropriate 
growing regimes and technologies for different 
vegetables and varieties (for example, Japanese 
versus European versus Chinese cucumbers). 
This set-up has survived since GEI’s funding 
ended in December 2008, with Snow Mountain 
still selling organic vegetables from Lijiang, 
higher farmers’ incomes and low carbon 
agriculture. However, coordinating the 
establishment of a fully functional alternative 
system of low carbon agriculture evidently 
faced significant hurdles. Moreover, there 
were barriers at each stage of the process. 
For instance, encouraging the farmers to 
join the cooperatives demanded significant 
encouragement, given the historical 
experiences of collective agriculture. Voluntary 
participation, choosing management 
by election and a clear share system for 
distribution of benefits was enough to 
overcome initial reluctance. 
Furthermore, lack of governmental support 
for the projects has also been a significant 
problem. In particular, when the cooperatives 
were initially established in 2006, there was as 
yet no law conferring legal status upon them, 
though this followed luckily in October 2007. 
Finally, today significant challenges remain, 
including the lack of transport infrastructure 
for transporting the organic vegetables to the 
big city markets, and the discouraging effect 
this has on finding investors in developing 
the project and spreading the model further. 
Urbanisation and construction is also 
threatening some of the farms.
Development through new connections
Mainstream understanding of innovation, in 
its focus on high-technology and associated 
metrics of patents and R&D expenditures, 
tends to overlook numerous important aspects 
of the innovation process. According to a 
recent report from the STEPS centre at Sussex 
University, three such issues in particular 
merit greater attention, namely ‘direction’, 
‘distribution’ and ‘diversity’ – the ‘3Ds’.25 These 
are both important in their own right and 
particularly significant regarding sustainability, 
this by definition being a matter of sustainable 
flows, a process not an end-state, and one 
dependent upon participation and information 
input from across society. The call for broader 
civic engagement in innovation at the heart 
of the 3Ds agenda is thus also the ‘essence of 
sustainability’.26 
By ‘direction’ is meant the fact that socio-
technical change necessarily involves broader 
normative social choices between possible 
trajectories regarding the kind of society that 
innovation is bringing about. Following this 
argument, ‘distribution’ refers to the questions 
of equity regarding who benefits and who 
loses from innovation trajectories – the status 
quo of gross and growing inequalities clearly 
being unjust and a significant contribution to 
ecological unsustainability. Finally, ‘diversity’ 
refers to the fact that addressing such issues 
need not presume a single and universally 
applicable best solution to any challenge 
addressed by innovation. Rather, a diverse set 
of context-sensitive innovation trajectories is 
itself a significant element of any attempt to 
address the prior two concerns.
Throughout these considerations, we may 
also note that a fourth ‘D’ is clearly central: 
development. Direction and distribution 
concern questions of who gains, while diversity 
refers to the fact that multiple models of 
innovation are needed to reflect the similarly 
diverse contexts and needs of developing 
countries. Such prioritisation of development 
is especially germane in the case of China. 
Despite the skyscrapers of Pudong, China 
remains largely a developing country. Even 
while over 200 million people have risen out 
of poverty in China since ‘reform and opening 
up’ in 1978, there are still 150 million living 
on under $2 a day, average farmers’ incomes 
are $756 p.a. and GDP per capita is $3,200 
p.a. Furthermore, while the rural population 
is shrinking steadily as people move to 
burgeoning mega-cities, it still represents 
67 per cent of the population. Development 
of rural and agricultural areas is one of the 
priorities in the 11th 5-year Plan, with central 
government attending to the san nong (or 
‘three rurals’ of agriculture, village, and farmer) 
to promote the development of rural areas. 
Environmental pressures, particularly from 
water shortages, industrial pollution and land 
loss through urbanisation, are also serious 
challenges in rural areas that make sustainable 
development an imperative. 
Socio-economic development is thus the 
absolutely top priority of Chinese policymakers 
at all levels of government. Unfortunately, 
this is too often identified with GDP growth 
alone, though the central government in 
particular is driving changes to incorporate 
other essential issues such as environmental 
sustainability and social equity under the 
slogans of ‘circular economy’ and ‘harmonious 
development’. But it remains the case that any 
low carbon initiative that ignores development 
considerations is unlikely to take root in China. 
Furthermore, the utmost importance of China 
to global debates about responses to climate 
change does all developing countries – and, 
indeed, the world – the service of highlighting 
how development questions are inextricable 
from a global low carbon transition.
Low carbon innovation that takes issues 
of development – and hence direction, 
distribution and diversity – seriously are thus 
crucial in China. Engagement of poor farmers 
in low carbon innovation, however, clearly 
is not best served by focusing on hi-tech 
innovation. Rather, as GEI’s Lijiang project 
illustrates perfectly, technologies are crucial 
but they must be low-cost and tailored to the 
specific social needs of that locality: suggesting 
‘3Ls’ – of low-cost, low-tech and low carbon 
innovation – that give practical expression 
to the ‘3D’ principles. The most important 
forms of innovation, however, will often be 
institutional innovations, forging new but 
dependable relations that support the change 
in farmers’ practices that are both socio-
economically and ecologically sustainable, 
creating the necessary context for successful 
uptake of the low carbon technology. But 
Lijiang also illustrates how mediation assistance 
may well be needed to facilitate the formation 
of these new relations, as in the establishment 
of the cooperatives and their connections 
with organic vegetable wholesalers. Disruptive 
innovation, effecting a social redefinition of 
technologies, can thus unlock development-
relevant innovation and user-centred 
innovation. 
From coal to cotton stalks
Looking out of the window at the countryside 
below as you come into land in Beijing or 
Shanghai, one distinctive feature tells you 
you are in China: the flat blue and red roofs 
of the industrial buildings. As their ubiquity 
testifies, to talk of ‘rural China’ as if it were 
just a matter of agriculture is clearly mistaken. 
Rather, as MIT’s Huang Yasheng has argued, 
the great success of Chinese growth in the 
1980s is a story of growth by township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) engaged in ‘rural’-
based industries.27 To define the countryside 
and industry as mutually exclusive is thus 
to overlook the backbone of China’s recent 
meteoric economic growth.
The need to challenge understanding based on 
strict sectoral divisions is even greater in the 
context of a low carbon transition. Systems-
changing innovation often involves the blurring 
or crossing of familiar boundaries between 
industries and sectors, just as it involves the 
formation of new social relations. Shengchang 
Bioenergy’s business, for instance, brings 
together industrial manufacturing, energy and 
agriculture in the form of biomass pellets and 
their associated combustion equipment.
The established farming practice of burning 
crop residues is a significant source of GHGs 
and soot in China, but tackling this problem 
needs an alternative use for these stalks and 
husks. Converting these residues, from various 
crops, into easily handled and efficiently 
combustible pellets not only cleans this 
combustion process. But by putting it to useful 
work it can replace the combustion of coal by 
individual farmers and buildings, which itself is 
one of the most inefficient and polluting ways 
of burning the ubiquitous black stuff. Given 
the sheer number of Chinese farmers, shifting 
towards efficient combustion of biomass 
pellets thus could have a major impact on 
GHG emissions and air quality, while creating 
viable businesses and new sources of long-term 
employment.
Shengchang Bioenergy has made this vision 
its own. Starting in 2006, CEO Fu Youhong 
stepped away from his prior experience in 
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pharmaceuticals motivated (like the other 
entrepreneurs profiled in this report) by 
concerns about the environment. Following 
significant research into the renewable energy 
options in Europe, he chose biomass as an 
issue that would be particularly significant 
in the Chinese context. The business has 
two main technological innovations: in the 
pelleting process and in construction of boilers. 
Regarding the former, issues of temperature 
and pressure control demanded significant 
adaptation and development of their own 
pelleting technologies, including pre-treatment 
techniques for the raw material. Biomass 
burning boilers also had to be developed if 
there was to be any demand for the pellets. 
Existing technologies from overseas were tried, 
but were found to be incompatible with pellets 
from local residues as these are not graded and 
standardised as they are in Europe. Accordingly, 
the company had to develop its own boilers, 
based on technologies from Beijing’s Tsinghua 
University that already existed but were not 
being deployed for any commercial use.
As with GEI, however, the feasibility of 
these technological innovations depended 
upon forging new connections to transform 
farmers’ habits and to encourage them both 
to deliver their residues for payment and then 
to substitute biomass for coal in their heating 
and cooking. Researching the viability of 
this business model in the initial markets of 
Beijing’s rural counties, a transport feasibility 
study was conducted with local government 
support, involving 2,000 students over the 
summer of 2008. This established that all raw 
materials would have to come from under 
20km or else farmers would not consider it 
worth their while to make the journey. This 
conclusion, however, has added an extra low 
carbon dimension to Shengchang’s business 
strategy, providing a model for a locally 
distributed rural energy source.
Armed with this analysis, there were still 
the significant challenges of setting up the 
institutions and routines to persuade farmers 
actually to change their behaviour. Routine 
deliveries of biomass pellets were established, 
and local farmers were informed of the 
economic benefits available from selling their 
residues and transferring to biomass burners. 
New relations were also established with village 
government committees, who were approached 
for support in encouraging farmers to change 
over. Embedded systems of coal burning, 
including government support for the industry, 
also acted as a significant source of inertia. 
Shengchang has itself received some significant 
support from various levels of government. 
The general efforts of government regarding 
environmental protection have helped raise 
awareness of the issues, encouraging demand 
for the pellets. More directly, the central 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Beijing city 
government both underwrote the transport 
feasibility study and an arm’s-length 
assessment of the SO2 and CO2 emissions 
of the pellets, which showed significant 
environmental benefits in comparison to coal. 
Local government also provides a subsidy (on 
a per tonne basis) for sales of the biomass 
pellets. This subsidy has no explicit expiry date, 
but it could be ended at any time. It is likely, 
however, that the company will soon no longer 
depend upon it as the business is growing 
well and is shifting towards profit. There are 
now 160 employees working at three biomass 
pelleting plants (in Beijing and rural counties of 
Beijing municipality) with capacity for 20,000 
tonnes of pellets per year made from wood 
chips, cornstalks, cotton stalks and peanut 
shells. These are packed into 50kg bags and 
delivered to farmers, or shipped by a specially 
adapted trailer for industrial customers. 
In 2008, a machine factory was also established 
in Daxing Industrial Development Area in 
south Beijing, producing biomass combustion 
equipment specifically adapted for the pellets. 
These include hot water boilers for individual 
households, industrial boilers (from 0.7 to 7 
MW) including for central heating systems, and 
– of perhaps greatest symbolic importance – a 
patented cooking stove costing under RMB 
200 (£20) that directly competes with the coal 
briquette burners that are a staple feature of 
Chinese streets. More recently, the company 
has also moved further upstream in its supply 
chain, establishing its own pelleting machine 
factory in the northwest Beijing district of 
Haidian. This has already provided a further 
three pelleting plants to rural districts of 
Beijing, thereby spreading the model of locally 
sourced biomass.
Finally, as awareness of the environmental 
costs of coal and oil, as well as experience of 
natural gas shortages in recent cold snaps (for 
example, November 2009), spreads, the market 
for those looking for alternative and sustainable 
sources of energy is growing. Shengchang is 
thus receiving growing attention and sales 
requests from across the country, for both 
pellets and boilers. Negotiations are ongoing 
regarding five investments to establish locally-
sourced biomass, and the company is already 
committed to investing in pellet factories in 
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Hubei (in central China) and Heilongjiang (in 
the north east). Building strong links with 
the farmers who are both consumers of its 
pellets and boilers and suppliers of the residue 
feedstocks has been, and will continue to be, 
the key to the business model.
2.3 Policy must keep pace
Green growth vs. Green lakes
Amongst the grievous environmental 
challenges facing China, water is undoubtedly 
one of the biggest and closest to crisis. 
Problems of scarcity, especially in the north 
and west of the country, are exacerbated by 
problems of pollution, which reduce even 
further the amount of potable water available 
to China’s 1.3 billion people. Two images 
capture these problems particularly vividly: 
on the one hand, a dried up Yellow River, the 
cradle of Chinese civilisation and its agriculture, 
which now doesn’t reach the sea for several 
months a year; on the other, the algal blooms 
that have occasionally painted Tai Hu, the 
country’s largest fresh water lake, bright green. 
While the former problem is largely due 
to wasteful water practices in agriculture, 
which accounts for more than two-thirds 
of water consumption, China’s burgeoning 
industrialisation is both a significant 
contribution to scarcity – e.g. coal mining 
involves huge amounts of water, which may 
thus be the de facto limiting factor on coal, 
rather than GHG targets – and the most 
significant cause of water pollution. Polluted 
waste-water, however, also contributes to 
climate change in the form of the energy that is 
wasted by releasing heated water into rivers, or 
pre-cooling to clean the water before discharge 
in order to meet environmental regulations.
Beijing Sinen En-tech’s (or Zhong Neng Huan 
Ke – China Energy Environment Technology 
Company – ZNHK) low carbon innovation 
directly tackles both of these problems through 
a system that allows high-efficiency cleaning 
of waste-water at elevated temperatures. The 
clean, still-hot water can then be recycled back 
into the industrial process, hence reducing 
energy use in heating and cooling, cleaning the 
water for eventual discharge and cutting water 
use.
The company is the brainchild of CEO Yang 
Yucheng, following more than 20 years working 
on energy saving and conservation at the major 
petrochemical SOE, Sinopec. In the 1990s, 
while still at Sinopec, Yang began to cooperate 
with a professor from China University of 
Petroleum (CUP) in research regarding energy 
saving technologies. This led, in 2002, to the 
establishment of a research institute in Beijing 
dedicated to these issues. It was here that 
Yang developed the chemical basis of ZNHK’s 
core technology, a (now patented) chemical 
membrane and carbon fibre filter to remove 
inorganic and organic pollutants respectively. 
Without interest from his CUP partner in 
commercialisation, he set up his own company 
in 2004 to integrate the technology with other 
familiar technologies as a relatively low-cost 
product for high temperature waste-water 
recycling. 
Funding for this venture was not easy to find. 
In 2004, environmental issues remained quite 
low on the political agenda and so there was 
no interest from government. Bank loans were 
also unavailable, while venture capital was 
still only embryonic in China. Nevertheless, 
greatly concerned about resources saving and 
environmental conservation from his work in 
these fields, he managed to find some partners 
and together they invested RMB 600,000 
(£60,000) of their own money. 
Since then, growth and investment have been 
strong. Establishment of the company was 
soon followed by RMB 2 million of investment 
from a Xinjiang-based investment company 
specifically interested in high temperature 
water recycling, which ZNHK alone was 
tackling. The company also succeeded in being 
certified as a ‘high-tech enterprise’ in Beijing’s 
Zhongguancun district in 2004 and, at the end 
of 2008, as a ‘national high-tech enterprise’. 
Both of these certifications were crucial for 
the business in these early stages, bringing 
significant financial support that is reserved 
for such ‘hi-tech’ companies, such as tax 
breaks, innovation funding and interest-free or 
prolonged payback loans. Access to this crucial 
source of finance, however, depended entirely 
upon the definition of ‘hi-tech’ employed 
by the government. It was thus of utmost 
importance for ZNHK that the environmental 
law of 2004 recognised energy conservation 
for the first time as a sector capable of hi-tech 
certification. 
This is not to suggest that ZNHK’s business is 
dependent upon government support. Rather, 
in classic disruptive innovation fashion, it is 
offering a low-cost alternative that services a 
demand hitherto neglected as unprofitable. The 
stand-alone economic case for its innovation 
is also strong, with cost savings from reduction 
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of energy and water use offering payback 
on capital expenditure in most cases in less 
than 12 months. As a result, ZNHK reached 
profitability in 2006-7, and its revenues grew 
262 per cent from 2006 to 2008, reaching 
RMB 35 million in 2008. To date, over 20 
systems have been installed, mainly at SOE 
petrochemical plants, including Sinopec, and 
some chemical companies, though the service 
is suitable for many other industries, including 
steel, metallurgy, coal, textiles, fertiliser and 
pharmaceuticals, all of which have significant 
energy requirements. This success has also 
been recognised with various accolades and 
awards. For instance, in 2008 Yang and the 
company were a cover story in Forbes China, 
featured in an Al-Jazeera news report on 
greentech in China and were listed in the 
Deloitte’s ‘high-tech with high-growth’ China 
top 50 and at 67 in the Asia-Pacific top 500. 
ZNHK’s low carbon innovation is disruptive in a 
number of ways. While it involves a new, high 
technology dependent on some considerable 
R&D, its commercialisation has been entirely 
dependent upon integrating this technology 
into a low-cost system, which also involves 
established technology. Indeed, ZNHK is a 
perfect example of how disruptive innovation is 
an issue that is largely orthogonal to the hi- or 
low-tech nature of the technologies it deploys. 
The substantive effect of ZNHK’s innovation 
is also targeted at novel practices, disrupting 
the standard waste practices of many industrial 
firms and using familiar technologies to recycle 
hot waste-water back through the industrial 
process. As the only patented waste-water 
treatment that conforms with new, tighter 
government standards for water purity, the 
innovation also crosses the boundaries between 
energy, industry and water.
The particular lesson for low carbon innovation, 
however, is the crucial role of government 
and policy change to facilitate such disruptive 
low carbon innovation. First, there is the utter 
dependence of the company’s fortunes in its 
early stages upon the recognition or not of 
energy-saving in the government’s definition of 
‘hi-tech business’. Secondly, connections with 
the state have also been a key characteristic 
of ZNHK’s success in the form of its initial 
contracts with SOEs. Certainly, after two 
decades in the business, Yang had some 
strong guanxi that he could mobilise in the 
case of Sinopec. But this was by no means the 
only reason for this strategy. The heightened 
demands for environmental improvements 
placed upon SOEs by the central government 
and their consequent demand for energy 
and resource efficiency measures also made 
them particularly good clients. As SOEs, these 
customers also had deeper pockets than private 
companies may have had, with performance 
rather than value for money being the primary 
consideration. Using SOEs as initial customers 
has thus given ZNHK the time and experience 
to improve their technology and services to the 
levels necessary before turning to the private 
and SME markets; for instance, reducing the 
time for installation from three months to 
one. In short, using the national incumbents 
as primary customers has facilitated the 
emergence and strengthening of these novel, 
non-incumbent disruptive innovators.
Bike to the future
An urban myth about China concerns a man 
who walks past a park on his way to work one 
morning, and returns at the end of the day to 
find a tower block. Whatever the veracity of 
the tale, there can be no doubt that China’s 
landscape and the society it expresses and 
supports are changing at an extraordinary 
pace. Questions of development in China thus 
involve not only rural and agricultural issues, 
but also industrialisation (as per ZNHK) and a 
process of urbanisation the scale and pace of 
which is without precedent in human history.
It is in transport, rather than construction, 
however, that the daunting and dauntingly 
fast growth of China’s cities is most easily 
visualised, in particular in the rapid emergence 
and paradoxical stasis of the increasingly 
congested urban highways. Only 20-plus years 
ago, the vision of Chinese roads was still a 
river of bicycles; the one-gear bicycle being 
the mode of transport of choice as cheap 
to buy and ‘run’, enabling of voluntaristic 
‘auto’-mobility and faster than travel by foot. 
However, as incomes have grown, particularly 
in the East, car ownership has also grown at an 
extraordinary pace, with a (preferably big) car 
becoming a sought-after status symbol. The 
automotive sector has also received significant 
central and local government support as a 
national pillar industry and a key element 
of many local economies (for example, in 
Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou).28 As a 
result, in January 2009 the Chinese car market 
overtook the US to become the largest in the 
world – some 5-10 years before predictions 
published even in the previous December 
(though this was in part due to the post-crash 
collapse of the US market).
As the perpetual traffic jams of Beijing (and 
Shanghai and Wuhan and Kunming...) and 
problems of parking space demonstrate, 
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however, the density of population in China 
raises serious questions about the possibility 
of car ownership expanding much more. Even 
more importantly, GHG emissions from China’s 
cars are also growing steeply. Indeed, car 
intensity per person equivalent to current US 
levels would place China’s cars consuming all 
the oil produced in the world each year.29 Yet 
with each passing day, China becomes more 
deeply embedded into the ‘car system’, roads 
have been rebuilt for vehicles, and bicycles – 
the former low carbon technology of choice – 
are increasingly driven (literally) off the roads.
Such growth is clearly not sustainable, in 
any sense of the term. So it is good news 
that bikes seem to be making something of 
a return, especially as it is in the disruptive 
low carbon form of the electric bicycle that 
may compete directly with the car. With 70 
per cent of electric power generated through 
coal combustion, electricity from the grid is 
certainly not (yet) carbon-neutral. Yet even 
under current conditions, a shift from oil to 
electricity has a significantly positive effect on 
transport emissions.30 This is even more marked 
where the vehicle is a bike of several kilos as 
opposed to a car of several tonnes. 
Lüyuan (meaning ‘green energy’) is one of 
the oldest and strongest competitors in this 
market. In 1996, CEO Ni Jie visited a research 
institute in Beijing where they were working 
on electric vehicles. Struck by the technology 
but also its difficulties, he decided that 
development of an electric bicycle could be a 
more profitable route. Accordingly, back at his 
base in Jinhua, Zhejiang province, he began 
to conduct R&D with the support of local 
company Jin Xin Technological Venture Co. 
This led to establishment of the company in 
1997, pioneering the sale of e-bikes in China. 
Financial difficulties were encountered in the 
following years, as problems with the battery 
emerged, but with these rectified, Lüyuan has 
experienced strong growth from 2001. This 
success has been acknowledged in a variety of 
awards including 2005 ‘top 10 businessman in 
Zhejiang’ – the province that is often dubbed 
China’s ‘California’ for its entrepreneurial 
success – Zhejiang famous brand in 2006, 
and top 50 ‘fast-growing’ companies by ‘Fast 
Company’ magazine in 2007, alongside Nike 
and Honda.
The company now offers a whole range of 
e-bikes catering to a variety of customers. It 
is also in the process of developing 3-wheel 
models that are suitable for the disabled and 
for older users. In the future, the aim is to 
apply the company’s technological know-how 
to develop a cheap and convenient system to 
re-equip normal cars as electric vehicles. In 
each case, Lüyuan is offering a low-cost and 
low carbon alternative to cars.
The success of Lüyuan mirrors the widespread 
growth of e-bikes across the country, of which 
there are now over 120 million. But this growth 
has been so great that it has also unleashed a 
regulatory backlash, which is the major barrier 
to Lüyuan’s further expansion. Many e-bikes 
can reach top speeds of around 50km/h (35 
mph). They are also often loaded up with heavy 
goods. This has led many to associate the 
e-bike with accidents, crime (theft both using 
the bike and of the bike) and even congestion. 
E-bikes have thus been increasingly regulated 
or banned outright by local governments across 
the country, including in Beijing, Fuzhou, 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou. 
Working at a compromise to keep the market 
alive, Lüyuan has been participating in policy 
committees to establish a set of standards and 
regulations for their manufacture and use. In 
particular, a central government law was due 
to take force on 1st January this year. This 
would limit e-bikes to a maximum speed of 
20 km/h and maximum mass of 20kg. E-bikes 
exceeding these limits would be reclassified 
as e-motorcycles and so would require users 
to pass a driving test. This law would certainly 
dramatically reduce the market for e-bikes, but 
it has yet to take effect, in fact, and is currently 
indefinitely postponed. Lüyuan’s future thus 
remains highly uncertain.
States and standards
We have already considered above the 
importance to a low carbon transition of new 
connections that cross familiar boundaries, 
both in terms of social relations and regarding 
the novel conjunction of technologies. 
Indeed, as the veteran innovation scholar 
Brian Arthur has described in his most recent 
book, recombination of technologies is a key 
element of understanding the ‘evolution of 
technology’.31 Furthermore, business scholars 
Peter Williamson and Ming Zeng have argued 
in detail that recombination of technologies 
is a particular strength of Chinese innovation, 
as a route to providing low-cost options.32 
This strategy is also greatly supported by the 
modularity of many technologies in the context 
of globalisation.
Innovation, however, is always both a social 
and a technological process. And social factors 
include not only people and social life, but also 
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politics and policy. The parallel development 
of the three factors of this ‘technology-
people-policy nexus’ thus demands that policy 
also responds to and supports changes in 
technology and social practices.33 The mixing of 
technologies and blurring of social boundaries 
thus may often confound the set definitions of 
policy and its institutional context in ways that 
significantly stall progressive socio-technical 
change. Indeed, on the flipside, the element 
of discontinuity in systems these changes 
represent is precisely their strength as regards 
systems transition.
The Chinese Game-Changers perfectly illustrate 
the need for regulatory support and for it 
to keep up with changing practices through 
new policies and redefinition of existing ones; 
as evidenced in the development of new 
connections between many of these innovative 
companies – for example ZNHK, Lüyuan 
and Shengchang – and government for the 
drafting of relevant regulations and standards. 
For example, it was only when environmental 
technologies could be classified as ‘hi-tech’ 
that ZNHK could access the support that made 
their business model viable in its early stages. 
Similarly, regulations could either support or 
undermine Lüyuan’s e-bike, and legislation was 
needed to make GEI’s vegetable cooperatives 
legal entities. 
Standards are a further form of regulation 
upon which many of our case-studies explicitly 
commented. ZNHK noted the importance of 
tighter waste-water standards to stimulate 
demand for their product. Shengchang stated 
that national standards for biomass boilers 
would significantly assist their business, 
preventing farmers from having negative 
experiences with poorly made biomass 
combustion equipment that put them off the 
idea completely; a consideration that is also 
relevant regarding solar water heaters for 
Himin Group. Standards would also ensure that 
the potential low carbon benefits of biomass 
combustion are not squandered through 
cheaper, but less efficient, boilers. Similarly, 
formation of cooperatives for collection of 
agricultural residues together with standardised 
residue qualities would add considerable 
stability to prices for these materials, which 
would in turn further encourage farmers to 
participate in these markets. 
In the Chinese context, however, the role of 
government has added significance given the 
continuing strong presence of the state in the 
economy. This both poses particular challenges 
and raises singular opportunities for disruptive 
low carbon innovation in China. In particular, 
in several cases, where there is a regulatory 
drive towards the environmental goals serviced 
by their innovation, a number of our examples 
have successfully identified SOEs as an 
important market opportunity, especially in 
the early stages of the business (for example, 
ZNHK’s petrochemical SOEs and Pearl’s 
telecom companies). As we discuss below, this 
suggests important ways in which disruptive 
low carbon innovation in China can build on, 
rather than challenge, the existing structure of 
the national economy.
Achieving the impossible?
Innovation has often been associated with 
mania and hype, often leading to financial 
bubbles.34 Among the various philosopher’s 
stones animating such exaggerated hopes 
and quests, a perpetual motion machine must 
surely be one of the most famous. An ancient 
Chinese ‘water-drinking machine’ (a bird-like 
contraption that sits above the water surface 
and is pivoted at the ‘waist’ with a weighted 
bottom and a long metal ‘beak’ that bobs back 
and forth), however, has perplexed many with 
its claims to be an example of one. 
In fact, as Yuan Yijun, CEO of Hangzhou 
ISAW, explains, its seemingly ‘perpetual 
motion’ is scientifically explicable in terms 
of psychrometry. Psychrometry may itself 
sound like little more than a fancy name 
for ‘magic’; we must certainly admit not to 
have heard the term before! But in fact it is 
“the field of engineering concerned with the 
determination of physical and thermodynamic 
properties of gas-vapour mixtures” or in Yuan’s 
more accessible definition, the science of the 
“interaction of solar, air and water”, hence 
‘ISAW’. 
Exploiting knowledge of evaporation, Yuan 
has developed technologies for three main 
uses, all of which provide efficient low-cost 
ways to tackle significant low carbon issues for 
China and other developing countries, namely: 
industrial heat recovery; air-conditioning 
(cooling and heating); and solar desalination 
of salt water. In each case, the process is 
driven by exploiting the thermodynamics 
of evaporation between differing salt 
concentrations in water. For instance, the green 
air-conditioning process is a natural process 
under ambient pressure that involves no 
compressor or vacuum, just pure and salt water 
as working media. Conversely, industrial energy 
recovery, air-conditioning and desalination 
are conventionally all highly energy- (and so 
emission-) intensive.
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Yuan, as may be expected, is a scientist by 
background. Convinced of the opportunities 
for an energy-saving innovation based upon 
psychrometric principles, he first attempted 
a collaboration with an air-conditioning 
company in 2006. When this came to nought, 
he decided to set out on his own, establishing 
ISAW in 2007 and investing his own funds in 
the venture. His business strategy has been 
to exploit his psychrometric knowledge to 
create energy-saving technologies that are 
both low-cost in themselves and save expense 
through their energy efficiency. Developing a 
range of products for the three applications 
discussed above, he succeeded in 2008 in 
winning a contract with one of China’s largest 
real estate companies, Vanke, to incorporate 
his air conditioning technology in a new 
housing development in Shenzhen. This has 
been followed by contracts with Shanghai Expo 
and an Indian research institute. The energy 
recovery process has also been successfully 
commercialised in several cigarette factories, 
which are also usually local state SOEs. And 
export of the solar desalination technology to 
the water-stressed Middle East began in 2009 
with projects at American Beirut University and 
as part of the Masdar eco-city project, while 
negotiations are ongoing regarding an initiative 
in Yemen.
As a small company, not based in a designated 
hi-tech zone and offering equipment that, 
while scientifically sophisticated, tests the 
‘hi-tech’ definition in its deliberate targeting 
of low-cost technology, ISAW has faced 
similar challenges to those of ZNHK regarding 
access to support for ‘hi-tech’ companies. 
Yet whereas ZNHK has been lucky in terms of 
the timing of changes of government policy 
and its connections with state institutions 
and enterprises, ISAW illustrates how this is 
not the case for every disruptive low carbon 
innovator. It thus provides a salutary reminder 
of the significant challenges many such 
initiatives face from policy and, conversely, the 
extraordinary challenges policymakers face in 
keeping up with all the developments in low 
carbon innovation. 
In fact, ISAW has received some government 
funding for R&D, but the difficulty of accessing 
more general benefits and support for the 
business as a whole remains a major hurdle to 
the company’s growth. This is exacerbated by 
the current policy focus on users of low carbon 
technologies, especially regarding energy 
efficiency, rather than offering incentives to 
the low carbon innovators themselves. Yuan 
is nevertheless determined to develop ISAW’s 
marketing capacities – a crucial area of the 
business that, being a scientist, is not his 
own strength. Other near-term goals include 
building on collaborations and joint ventures to 
commercialise the air-conditioning technology 
as an integral part of green building practices 
and to expand the solar desalination business. 
The company will also continue to seek out 
larger investors to develop the business and to 
strengthen R&D.
2.4 Engage with the globalisation of 
innovation
Towards cosmopolitan innovation
Supported by major policy goals of an 
‘innovation-based economy’ by 2020 and 
indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin), 
innovation capacities are undoubtedly 
improving in China. Together with similar 
analyses regarding other major developing 
countries, such as India or Brazil, this has 
led to widespread identification of a trend 
towards a much greater spread of significant 
innovation capacities around the world.35 
This has led some ‘Western’ commentators 
to express fearful visions of a race that is 
increasingly being lost to these up-and-coming 
contestants.36
Such techno-nationalist responses are both 
wrong and irresponsible; the latter because 
of the danger of self-fulfilling prophecy, 
the former because the understanding of 
innovation itself and its interaction with 
economic growth is, at best, partial in these 
analyses. In particular, the globalisation of 
innovation is not just a matter of new players 
in an unchanged game. The very nature of 
innovation is itself changing, as contributions 
from disparate parts of the globe come 
together in individual innovation processes. 
The classic example is the iPod, with innovation 
taking place not just in the US but across the 
world.37 As a result, the rise of new global poles 
of innovation is likely to be a non-zero sum 
phenomenon with the potential for gains on all 
sides. 
Such globalised processes also unlock 
extraordinary potential for innovation that it 
would be a catastrophe to ignore in efforts 
to deal with global climate change. For no 
individual country has the capacity alone to 
move towards a low carbon society. Yet in 
advocating the importance of the globalisation 
of innovation, the 3Ds must be observed. There 
are multiple possible models of globalisation, 
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hence demanding that issues of direction 
are considered. ‘Distribution’ then raises the 
key question of ‘who gains?’, on a global 
scale, while ‘diversity’ reminds us that there 
is no single ‘best’ model of innovation, but 
rather a variety of regulations and concrete 
innovations are needed to serve the actual 
needs and capabilities of different localities and 
communities.
Recalling also the fourth ‘D’ of development, 
it is clear that a key question for global 
models of innovation is how innovation 
interacts with socio-economic development 
in particular places. Yet this relationship is 
highly complex and in no sense reducible to 
annual R&D expenditure or patent statistics. 
Rather it involves such fuzzy and slow-
changing factors as cultures of experimentation 
and entrepreneurship, attractive living 
environments, transport and communication 
infrastructures and flows of financial profits. 
As such, even while innovation capacities are 
growing in numerous developing countries 
with crucial non-zero sum implications, it is 
still easily imagined that the greatest gains 
from this innovation will accrue unevenly 
to the already wealthy. Indeed, current 
global rules, privileging strong global IPRs, 
overwhelmingly favour only a handful of 
highly concentrated industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, agribusiness and media; or 
rather protect them, as these are all industries 
whose current business models are facing 
significant challenges from the globalisation 
of innovation. Current trends thus permit no 
guarantees regarding the effects on China’s 
future in what really concerns it, namely the 
standard of living and the movement of its 
economy more broadly ‘up the value chain’. 
This is equally true of low carbon innovation, 
especially where it follows a hi-tech model. As 
a recent Chatham House report makes clear: 
“Brazil, China and India… have no companies 
or organisations in the top 10 positions in 
any of the sectors and sub-sectors analysed” 
and intellectual property in low carbon 
energy technologies is concentrated in the 
large incumbent multinationals from OECD 
countries.38 As such, the growing geopolitical 
influence of these countries may thus be 
expected also to bring major shifts in the 
global rules of innovation in order to shape the 
emerging “international division of labour of 
innovation”, in which low carbon innovation 
capacity will be a major factor, that will in turn 
be a major determinant of geopolitical power in 
the 21st century. 
One possibility is a techno-nationalist future of 
aggressively competing ‘blocs’, each engaging 
in their own hedged and inadequate efforts 
at climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Against this dystopic future, we advocate a 
‘cosmopolitan innovation’ regime that supports 
innovation that is globally connected and 
concerned – hence engaged with the challenge 
of climate change and capitalising upon the 
opportunities for expedited transition from 
the globalisation of innovation – but locally 
relevant and sensitive – responding to the 3Ds. 
International collaboration, involving mutual 
learning, must clearly be a major element of 
any such regime.
From ‘catch-up’ to collaboration
The Chinese Game-Changers show the 
importance of international collaboration 
for disruptive low carbon innovation and 
the opportunities for international learning 
from this type of innovation. For example, 
Pearl Hydrogen’s development of a full-
system solution for its fuel cell bicycle is in 
collaboration with an Italian company, just as 
its work on a racing car is a joint project with 
Imperial College, London. Similarly, ISAW has 
benefitted from joint research with colleagues, 
including Chinese academics, at Nottingham 
University and work at the Masdar eco-city 
in Abu Dhabi. GEI’s Snow Mountain Organic 
Corporation has also involved overseas 
investors, while its original project was partly 
funded by an American charity. 
In each of these cases, the crucial factor has 
been that the mutual benefit underpinning 
the successful collaboration produces a 
relationship that is significantly different 
from that presupposed by the seemingly 
intractable arguments of low carbon 
technology transfer. Instead, regardless of the 
undoubted importance of these high-level 
discussions, these relationships act as the basis 
for a wholesale reframing of the challenge of 
international collaboration regarding climate 
change. No longer should this be conceived, 
quite falsely, in terms of leader and follower, 
developed and developing nations respectively, 
but as an opportunity for China to set, and not 
merely follow, the innovation trajectory of a 
low carbon transition in collaboration with its 
partners.
But the opportunities from the globalisation of 
innovation for low carbon disruptive innovation 
are not limited to international collaboration 
alone. Engagement with globalisation also 
allows these low-cost innovators to source 
products or inputs cheaply. For instance, Pearl 
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Hydrogen buys standard Nafion membranes 
from overseas which it then treats to fit into 
its own technology. Conversely, the problems 
of European boilers burning Chinese biomass 
pellets encountered by Shengchang remind 
us that this is not always possible and local 
innovation is often necessary. 
On the other hand, globalisation opens up new 
markets for indigenous Chinese innovations. 
This may be in the form of ‘South-South’ sales, 
as for ISAW’s use of the Middle East as an entry 
market in which to develop its desalination 
technologies or its exports of air-conditioning 
to Masdar eco-city. GEI has also transferred its 
model to other developing countries, such as 
Sri Lanka and Laos. Nor are such sales between 
developing countries marginal, but they are 
likely to dominate the market for low carbon 
investment in the coming decades.
Finally, Chinese innovations may also succeed 
through ‘reverse’ or ‘periphery-to-core’ 
innovation, in which disruptive innovations 
that initially only offer profitability to small 
companies in developing countries then 
find unexpected but significant markets 
in developed ones.39 Though none of 
our examples has yet achieved this, it is 
conceivable that many could and will. Opening 
up to and shaping the globalisation of 
innovation is thus an important strategy for 
Chinese disruptive low carbon innovation, in 
the process expediting a low carbon shift on a 
global scale.
2.5 Four principles of low carbon 
innovation – revisited
In the 2007 Disrupters report, Rebecca Willis 
and her colleagues likewise suggested four 
principles of low carbon innovation. There is 
clearly significant overlap between their list and 
ours and the lessons from that report remain 
utterly pertinent to the present discussion. But 
our Chinese examples add to this discussion 
in two important ways. First, they bring to 
the fore a number of extra dimensions. These 
are crucial considerations for low carbon 
innovation at the necessary global level that 
also broaden the case for the importance of 
disruptive innovation, namely: socio-economic 
development; international collaboration; the 
diverse and important roles for government, 
even where hi-tech incubation and ‘picking 
winners’ is downplayed; and the singular 
opportunities for disruptive innovation in 
China, given current strengths and innovation 
capacities. 
Secondly, in the spirit of the 3Ds, our Chinese 
case studies translate the lessons from the 
original report in ways that add inflections 
and nuances that reflect the particular 
Chinese context. For instance, while disruptive 
innovation rightly highlights the importance 
of looking beyond hi-technology and so 
keeping it ‘in perspective’ (Lesson 1), the 
Chinese debate demands that this also admits 
the enduring political importance of the goal 
of creating a hi-tech economy. Similarly, 
discussions of trends towards ‘democratised’ 
user-led innovation (Lesson 2) tend to imagine 
the technologically literate, on-line and 
relatively affluent user of developed country 
markets. In China, and especially rural areas, 
however, ‘users’ includes reluctant users, 
such as farmers, who lack the resources to 
experiment, with all the risks involved, and are 
unused to technological change. 
‘Breaking open closed systems’ (Lesson 3) 
does not necessarily involve a radical shift 
in economic structures, with SOEs ‘opened 
up’ to a ‘level playing field’ of intense 
market competition, but includes them as a 
significant opportunity and source of demand 
for disruptive innovators. Finally ‘unusual 
connections’ (Lesson 4) includes not only 
the blurring of sectoral boundaries and the 
combination of innovations, aggregating 
towards tipping points of systemic change. 
Connections are also needed across levels 
of socio-economic development, between 
different types of institution (government/
SOEs, SMEs, NGOs, users and citizens), 
and across geographical borders through 
international collaboration. 
Translating these lessons in this way shows 
the exceptional importance and relevance of 
disruptive low carbon innovation to a country 
of 1.3 billion people that is undergoing 
unprecedented social change – whether in 
industrialisation, urbanisation or agriculture 
– and the exceptional challenges and 
opportunities that come with this. 
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Part 3: Towards disruptive innovation policy 
3.1 Lessons for low carbon transition
These case-studies of Chinese disruptive low 
carbon innovation offer a number of important 
lessons as China strives to shift to and shape 
the trajectory of a new sustainable and 
equitable model of development.
First, they show that there are numerous 
disruptive or game-changing low carbon 
innovators in China, many of which have 
already experienced significant success. While 
only seven have been profiled here, we did 
not have to dig deep to find our case studies 
and there are without doubt many, many 
more. There is thus significant entrepreneurial 
effort and imagination in China invested in low 
carbon ventures; dynamism that, like the UK 
examples, is “motivated both by a commitment 
to [environmental issues] and a desire to make 
a business opportunity out of a necessity”.40 
Moreover, these examples illustrate the 
particular relevance of disruptive low carbon 
innovation to China, given its needs, concerns 
and current innovation capabilities.
Secondly, even the seven ventures discussed 
here could have sizeable impact on GHG 
emissions (see Table 1). Indeed, some already 
have, as in the case of Himin Group and 
Lüyuan. But the potential in all cases is large, 
not least given the sheer size of China’s 
population and the global impact of China’s 
high and growing total GHG emissions. Total 
GHG savings in the next five years could 
equal as much as 66 million tonnes CO2e (CO2 
equivalent) per year – or the equivalent of 12 
million homes in the UK, 25 million homes in 
China. Growth of these companies and their 
low carbon effects may be even greater in 
the medium term, especially where there is 
successful reverse innovation or South-South 
sales. And these calculations do not include 
the potential for emergent effects, as these 
innovations contingently converge with other 
innovations into broader systems changes. 
Indeed, such complementarities are conceivable 
even between these case studies. For example: 
GEI’s rural cooperatives delivering agricultural 
residues to a Shengchang pellet factory on 
a Lüyuan or Pearl Hydrogen electric small 
truck; or buildings incorporating Himin hot 
water and ISAW air-conditioning, effecting 
quantum improvements in energy bills and 
commensurate strides in widespread adoption 
of the model; or industrial plants incorporating 
ZNHK waste-water treatment, ISAW heat 
recovery and Shengchang biomass heating.
Finally, all our examples have encountered a 
number of problems that demand new ways 
to support such low carbon innovation better. 
Although many have received government 
support and access to private innovation 
finance is improving more generally, it remains 
the case that innovation policy, including 
for low carbon, is focused on major projects 
of government-led and high-technology 
breakthroughs. Conversely, these SMEs are 
already a significant asset to the Chinese 
economy and to the development of an 
innovation-based economy, yet they struggle 
to achieve the attention of policymakers. 
As a result, communication regarding the 
redesign and introduction of specific policies 
that would support their embryonic ventures 
is forestalled and growth of the companies is 
itself restrained, to the cost of the Chinese 
economy as much as the initiatives themselves. 
And funding for these low-cost innovations 
is scarce, while financial support may be 
necessary in early stages, especially where 
the disruptive innovation is competing with 
entrenched and closed systems.
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45. Firewood and deforestation 
savings from An Xin and 
Chen Zhiping (2008) Solving 
the issue of sustainable 
development in rural China 
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Methane calculation 
based on 1.5m3 per day, 
methane density of 1.82kg/
m3.  Savings from avoiding 
deforestation and reduced 
inorganic fertilizer use 
are not included in this 
calculation, though they too 
could be significant.
46. Figures from ISAW.
47. Figures from Pearl 
Hydrogen.
48. Figures from Shengchang.
49. Figures from ZNHK.
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Table 1: Estimated GHG reduction potential of the Chinese Game-Changers
  
Estimated Impact 
Total e-bike market of 120 
million bikes, replacing cars 
running about 10,000km/
year, with savings of at 
least 1 t CO2e per vehicle42
1 x 2m2 solar tank saves 
300kg coal per year43  
Saves 4.2t per household,44 
release of 1t of methane 
and deforestation of 8 mu45 
Energy recovery for 1 
cigarette factory  
 
1 t steam cooling & heating 
(= 50m2 floor space) for a 
year  
 
1 solar desalination plant at 
daily capacity of 100,000 
litres water per day
One 1kW fuel cells, average 
operating time is about 300 
hrs per year, can save about 
40kg standard coal
400 boilers at Zhangziying 
Greenhouse Project vs. 
coal-fired boilers 
Cooking stoves use 1kg per 




Industrial boilers estimated 
savings from one 18,000 sq 
meter building (Economic 
Times)
Saves 8,400t coal per year 
for 1 petrochemical plant of 
typical 100t/h steam49
Savings t CO2e per 
year41




0.7t per year per tank 
22t per year per 
household (mostly 


























Potential for scaling up 
(approx. 5 yrs)
Growth is uncertain due to 
regulation, but conservative 
estimate of 10 per cent 
growth in 5 years 
Total solar thermal market 
of 200 million families
Grow model to 10,000 
households 
 
Currently 5 cigarette 
factories fitted. Fitting of 
energy recovery units in all 
(≈100) cigarette factories
5 per cent of Chinese 
air-conditioning market 
(conservative estimate of 





Sales projected of up to 
30MW in 5 years
 
 
Sales of 10,000 boilers  
 
Production capacity of 
10,000 stoves per day 
hence total sales of 3.6m 
per year
Total aggregate sales of 
22m in 5 years




Fitted in total of 60 plants
Total potential savings 

















































































Sub-total for new ventures
Total
For instance, the definition of ‘hi-tech 
business’ needed to be changed before ZNHK 
could take advantage of the crucial financial 
supports available for such companies. 
ZNHK, Shengchang and Lüyuan all explicitly 
mentioned the importance of national 
standards, while others, such as ISAW and 
Himin, would also no doubt benefit from 
them. Pearl Hydrogen, ISAW and GEI have 
struggled to get government assistance, while 
Shengchang, Pearl and GEI are all tackling 
closed systems that do enjoy considerable 
government support, in the form of coal, cars 
and construction respectively.
3.2 Iterative innovation and 
institutional learning
How, then, can government better support 
these disruptive innovators in the broader 
context of optimising their contribution to 
a transition to an equitable and sustainable 
low carbon system? It is not our role here to 
formulate concrete policies, not least given the 
importance of broad participation and local 
considerations for governance of low carbon 
innovation under the 3Ds agenda advocated 
here. Instead, we suggest five considerations 
that should be explicitly addressed by 
policymakers in formulating such policies:
3.2.1 Policy should take account of the 
crucial opportunities for China regarding 
disruptive low-carbon innovation
The first consideration addresses the 
commitment to incorporate disruptive low 
carbon innovation into policy in the first place. 
Doing so will undoubtedly involve extra policy 
work, to understand, devise and implement 
policies that assist a group of low carbon 
innovators previously not often considered 
important. Before proceeding to more concrete 
concerns, therefore, we must first ascertain 
why such extra work is worthwhile, indeed 
necessary. To recap, there are numerous 
reasons, both in general and for China in 
particular.
First, to bring about a low carbon systems 
transition, focusing on a ‘Plan A’ of hi-tech 
improvements, while itself crucial, will not be 
enough. This is not only because it is extremely 
unlikely to be able to produce the kind of 
reduction in GHG emissions required and in 
the exceptionally tight time constraints, but 
also because such systems innovation will 
require incubation of the wild cards and ‘small 
beginnings’ from which profound socio-
technical change is likely to emerge. This is 
thus not so much a ‘Plan B’ as a ‘Plan A+B’. 
Disruptive innovation, producing a social 
redefinition of technologies, also offers an 
important route to maximise the impact of 
existing low carbon technologies that will have 
primary responsibility for the vast majority 
of emissions reductions by a 2050 deadline. 
Engendering these small disruptive innovations 
will also add diversity and hence resilience 
to the emerging low carbon socio-technical 
regime – a crucial consideration in the face 
of the extreme complexity, openness and 
uncertainty of this social and political transition 
process.
Secondly, global climate change demands 
that low carbon innovation will remain an 
utter priority for socio-economic activity for 
the foreseeable future. Global leadership in 
low carbon innovation will thus be a major 
determinant of the overall competitive 
strength of various national and regional 
innovation systems in the 21st century. 
Given that no country yet has a low carbon 
society, the firms that will dominate the low 
carbon global economy in many domains are 
probably not yet household names – even 
while it is existing low carbon technologies 
that will be most important in the low carbon 
transition. Most currently dominant firms 
have innovation capabilities and managerial 
capacities that make them a success in their 
current high-carbon context. Conversely, 
disruptive low carbon innovators are likely to 
feature prominently in this regard, as their 
very strength is the ability to exploit market 
opportunities that break away from established 
innovation trajectories and would be 
unprofitable and/or organisationally difficult 
for large and established firms. 
Disruptive low carbon innovation is thus 
important for all national economies. But, 
following the latter point in particular, it is also 
likely to be especially important for a rapidly 
developing country such as China. Indeed, 
a major element of low carbon innovation 
policy in China is anxiety regarding whether 
or not some of the dominant firms of the low 
carbon economy will (or can) be Chinese. 
Such concerns are particularly intense given 
the continued domination of existing hi-tech 
low carbon technologies by OECD-based 
companies, set alongside the highly proprietary 
global economic regulatory architecture for 
innovation that privileges just such intellectual 
property ownership of high technologies.50
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China’s innovation capabilities are improving 
rapidly, but it remains the case that the singular 
strength of the current innovation system 
is the development of low-cost solutions 
addressing the needs of previously excluded 
customers. Far from being a comparative 
weakness, however, this may well be a much 
more effective and faster route to strong 
hi-tech capabilities and globally leading firms 
than targeting these goals directly. This is 
even more the case given the characteristics of 
the demand for low carbon innovations, with 
approximately 70 per cent of future low carbon 
investment coming from similarly developing 
countries that will have low-cost requirements 
that much more closely match those of the 
domestic Chinese context than those of the 
relatively wealthy customers of OECD-based 
companies.
Drawing public attention to the opportunities 
for disruptive low carbon innovation, which 
would be profitable from the outset and 
focused on low-cost solutions, would also 
help to allay widespread apprehension that 
serious low carbon measures are expensive, 
beyond the capabilities and financial resources 
of most Chinese firms (and customers) and 
hence ‘anti-growth’. Such a public campaign 
would also thereby target the widespread 
apathy to innovation per se amongst many 
Chinese businesses, who continue to be 
profitable largely on the basis of cheap labour 
costs and export sales. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most importantly, highlighting the exceptional 
opportunities for Chinese disruptive low carbon 
innovation would help engender a movement 
towards the broader public recognition of the 
potential for China to shape, and not merely 
follow, the low carbon trajectory. This would 
be a profound change of mindset for many and 
one that could catalyse an entirely different 
dynamic for low carbon innovation and on a 
global scale.
Finally, as a Plan A+B, there is no reason that 
China’s support for development of its hi-tech 
innovation capabilities cannot continue while 
space is created to incubate its game-changing 
low carbon innovators. Rather, these could 
be seen as complementary, with the growing 
capacities and technological sophistication 
of the game-changing innovators (as well as 
their customers, stakeholders and regulators) 
embedding the broader cultures of innovation 
and commercialisation experience that are 
crucial for hi-tech innovation itself.
In short, the extra policy work needed for 
an explicit disruptive low carbon policy 
is worthwhile because of the exceptional 
opportunities for China in incubating such 
innovations. The substance of such a policy 
raises a number of further questions, to which 
we now turn.
3.2.2 Policy should create spaces for these 
types of innovation
Disruptive innovation, in principle, should 
involve a new product or service that offers 
immediate opportunities for profit, at least to 
small and flexible firms. Our Chinese Game-
Changers illustrate this perfectly, yet they also 
indicate that having a potentially profitable 
offering by no means guarantees success. 
Rather, even disruptive innovations can be 
forestalled by closed sociotechnical systems 
that lock in incumbents and lock out new 
players. These considerations are relevant both 
regarding encouragement of start-ups and 
their subsequent embedding and hence policy 
cannot be ‘neutral’ regarding the players it 
chooses to support, in whatever capacity. 
A Plan A+B, therefore, needs concerted efforts 
both: (1) to forge the institutional space, or 
niches, in which the novel connections that 
characterise disruptive low carbon innovations 
can be explored and developed, so that they 
are relatively robust organisations before taking 
the further step of expansion and broader 
societal impact; and (2) to consider and shape 
the extent to which there is room for non-
incumbents to play a significant role in the low 
carbon transformation of particular sectors. 
Furthermore, as many such innovations will 
fail to take hold in this second stage, multiple 
niches and experiments are needed. Creating 
such spaces would then allow these innovators 
to lead indigenous and endogenous processes 
of low carbon change.
Such a policy of experiments clearly would fit 
well with the pragmatic approach adopted by 
the central government to the whole process 
of economic reforms of the past three decades. 
It was as an experiment in Anhui that the 
household responsibility system of agricultural 
reform began, breaking up collective farms. 
Similarly, the success of the SEZs (special 
economic zones) such as Shenzhen catalysed 
the expansion of the model to other cities. 
The sheer size and diversity of China and its 
government structures, with relatively devolved 
powers to the provinces and municipalities 
and local GDP per capita levels ranging from 
the relative wealth of Shanghai to the poverty 
of Guizhou, could also be exploited as a 
significant strength, providing the opportunity 
for a huge variety of low carbon experiments, 
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with successful projects acting as templates 
for national, and indeed international, learning 
(see below). 
Furthermore, these low carbon niches could 
take the form of ‘low carbon zones’ that 
offer fiscal benefits and regulatory support. 
By pulling low carbon innovators together, 
including disruptive ones with boundary-
crossing innovations, these zones could 
also stimulate exploration of the potentially 
synergistic interaction of innovations and 
systems integrations that could drive major 
changes towards a low carbon shift. Such a 
policy is already under exploration, and in 
collaboration with international partners. For 
instance, UK think-tanks E3G and Chatham 
House together with the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences and NDRC’s Energy Research 
Institute are leading an EU-China project for 
low carbon zones with a demonstration project 
in Jilin.51 
To exploit these important developments 
fully, however, efforts must be made to 
ensure that they do not focus only on hi-tech 
innovation by SOEs or foreign JVs, or the 
commercialisation of hi-tech projects from 
universities and CAS institutes. Policymakers 
should question the extent to which such 
incumbents and familiar models of heavy 
industrial development can (alone) achieve the 
kind of low carbon transition they are seeking 
to seed and demonstrate in these zones. 
Rather, the zones should explicitly invite low 
carbon innovators that make use of established 
technologies but in innovative and low-cost 
ways that target previously ignored customers. 
Similarly, and more generally, all national and 
provincial ministries tasked with the detail of 
low carbon innovation policy should set aside 
at least a small, but high-level, team to ensure 
the needs of disruptive low carbon innovators 
are included in the formulation of such policies.
3.2.3 Policy should (seek to) provide the 
right kind of governance support
For disruptive innovation to flourish, then, it 
needs support from government, but this must 
be of an appropriate kind. In particular – and 
as argued in the 2007 report – the role of 
government must shift from one of controller 
or sponsor to one of enabler. In other words, 
the role of government is not to establish a 
‘policy-driven’ market, which creates unhelpful 
dependencies, let alone to lead top-down 
change. Rather it is to establish platforms 
and frameworks that help minimise risks 
and so enable innovators, users and citizens 
themselves to change. Unlocking the dynamism 
of the population at large in this way – ‘inviting 
innovation’, rather than simply delegating it 
– builds in the diversity and resilience needed 
for the expedited low carbon transition. It also, 
therefore, raises the inescapable decision of the 
extent to which innovation policy focuses only 
on incumbent firms (whether local, national, 
regional or global) for delivering a low carbon 
transition. This is just as true in the case of 
China as it is for the UK.
Current Chinese policy, both regarding low 
carbon innovation and more broadly, has 
much merit in this respect. For instance, on 
the one hand, many private companies that 
have proven significant successes (for example, 
Himin, BYD, Suntech, Chery or Geely) also now 
receive considerable policy support, at various 
levels of government. On the other hand, as 
a central pillar of the Chinese economy, SOEs 
must play a major role in any low carbon 
transition. Yet continuing support for SOEs is 
not per se contrary to such an enabling form of 
governance, both as regards the considerable 
management autonomy that many SOEs now 
enjoy and the competition they face and as a 
major early source of demand for low carbon 
innovation, as we have seen with ZNHK and 
Pearl Hydrogen. 
However, much more could be done by policy 
to assist China’s game-changers and at the 
appropriate level of government. For instance, 
the national level needs to provide the overall 
framework to support environmental and low 
carbon innovation. This would not only include 
general pressures towards energy efficiency 
and awareness building, but also creation of 
national standards on low carbon products 
and services and constant vigilance over who 
is covered, and who excluded, from policies of 
national support for ‘innovative’ companies. 
In particular, a refocusing of fiscal and 
other supports from ‘hi-tech’ to ‘innovative’ 
companies, more broadly defined, could 
significantly help many innovative companies 
that are excluded under current definitions. 
National platforms to allow low carbon 
innovators to find partners with compatible 
innovations or investment opportunities could 
also be useful to aggregate learning (see 
below).
It is at provincial and local levels, however, 
that most of the actual work of introducing 
an innovation will take place initially. 
Opportunities for direct contact with local 
policymakers, building the relationships needed 
for ongoing learning about the developing 
needs of these small businesses, are thus 
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crucial. This could be achieved to some extent 
through policies associated with low carbon 
zones that give businesses and other initiatives 
included in the zone a regular right of audience 
with the local policymakers, regardless of the 
size of their business or their existing guanxi. 
3.2.4 Policy could exploit the opportunities 
of low carbon innovation policy to improve 
governance (not just economic growth and 
innovation capacities)
As a socio-technical process, innovation 
inevitably places demands not just on the 
growth of innovation capacities but also on 
the forms and institutions of governance. 
Regarding developments in both innovation 
per se and ecological sustainability – hence 
low carbon innovation especially – there is a 
widespread consensus in the literature that 
these present considerable challenges to 
traditional top-down modes of governance. 
These challenges are relevant in all countries, 
but given the political structure, they are 
particularly germane in China. 
The parallel development of innovation and 
governance, however, allows us to look at 
the challenge from both perspectives and as 
an opportunity as much as a test. In short, 
just as low carbon innovation needs different 
governance, so conversely new governance 
is supported by different (patterns of) 
innovation. By shifting towards support for 
the existing Chinese strength of disruptive low 
carbon innovation, therefore, China can take 
important steps towards meeting the challenge 
of establishing forms of governance that would 
parallel emergence of a low carbon society. 
It is perhaps in this regard that current policy 
must change the most in order to capitalise 
upon the opportunities presented by China’s 
game-changers. In many respects, the current 
goal of innovation policy is to replicate 
the currently dominant American model of 
hi-tech, IPR-intensive and institutionally 
concentrated innovation, beating the US (and 
other countries) at its own game, but with 
SOEs instead of large private multinational 
corporations as the primary agents. Yet 
this model necessarily limits the broad civic 
engagement in innovation required for a 
sustainable low carbon transition and hence 
engenders forms of governance that are 
ill-suited to this challenge. Furthermore, 
it privileges firms with innovation and 
management capacities of which there are 
currently comparatively few in China. There 
is thus little reason for China to seek to 
emulate this model in its ongoing project of 
constructing a robust national innovation 
system.
Conversely, acknowledgement and increased 
engagement with disruptive innovators in the 
ways just discussed would be a significant 
improvement, involving SMEs in local and 
even national innovation policy in a way that 
remains uncommon. As policymakers and 
SMEs alike become more used to and adept 
at communication, governance structures 
would emerge that provide the former with the 
necessary information to support innovation 
and sustainability, while involving the latter 
in policy formation in ways that disperse 
governance as is needed to meet these 
challenges.
But such broader engagement would also 
need to include users and citizens, including 
via NGOs, to pay full attention to the 3Ds 
of direction, distribution and diversity. 
This engagement could take the form of 
opportunities for these groups to be directly 
involved in concrete examples of disruptive 
low carbon innovation, as in the case of GEI’s 
work in Lijiang, rather than focusing directly 
on political processes. By building up the 
capacities for engaged low carbon innovation, 
this could start a positive cycle of socio-
economic change and governance improvement 
developing in mutually reinforcing parallel.
Once again, an enabling mode of government 
would be needed to facilitate these 
developments, with platforms for active 
involvement of these various parties sponsored 
by government. To succeed, however, these 
platforms would need to be established 
with the explicit aim of deepening learning, 
including by government itself, of the 
conditions for low carbon innovation and the 
needs of those that it will service and affect.
3.2.5 Policy should maximise the 
opportunities for intra-national and 
international learning
From our experience of conversations both in 
China and in the UK, it is clear that it cannot 
be stated too often that no country yet has a 
low carbon society, nor does any single country 
have the innovation capacity to effect a low 
carbon transition alone. Rather, in striving 
towards an expedited low carbon systems 
transition we are faced with considerable 
uncertainties, ignorance and knowledge 
asymmetries and the great importance of 
unpredictable synergies, connections and 
combinations.
There are thus huge opportunities for mutually 
beneficial international collaborations and the 
global dissemination of the learning – both the 
‘first-order’ learning regarding technological 
or institutional innovations and the ‘second-
order’ learning about processes of innovation 
and international collaboration themselves 
– that comes with them. International 
collaborations will be crucial to optimise the 
impact of disruptive low carbon innovations 
by maximising connections and associated 
opportunities for broader social embedding. 
It also follows from our third consideration 
above, regarding niches, that a policy for low 
carbon innovation must prioritise the ability 
to monitor and build on these experiments, 
both nationally and internationally. While the 
first and fourth considerations thus primarily 
address Chinese policymakers, this final one 
thus concerns policymakers from all countries, 
including the UK.
The current system of international 
collaboration, both in China and elsewhere, 
tends to focus on publicly-funded academic 
scientific work, on the one hand, and openness 
to FDI, on the other, regarding ‘science’ and 
‘innovation’ respectively. Notwithstanding 
the need for improvement of these kinds of 
international collaboration themselves, it is 
clear that international collaboration between 
SMEs and other non-incumbents in low 
carbon innovation has received little attention 
and support. To be sure, such international 
collaboration may prove more difficult for 
smaller enterprises and initiatives, which may 
understandably be focusing on their domestic 
situation in the first instance. But as our case 
studies illustrate, this is by no means always 
the case and there are also considerable 
opportunities for international collaboration 
and learning between disruptive low carbon 
innovators.
Such learning will spread via, and arise from, 
both formal and informal interactions. But 
both of these will need the construction of 
new platforms, whether to fund the events 
and outputs of the former or to facilitate the 
new bottom-up connections of the latter. In 
both cases, these platforms would provide the 
necessary conditions both to forge new long-
term relations, building the trust and stability 
that are such crucial elements of encouraging 
the innovation and behavioural changes that 
will coalesce into systems transition, and to 
establish the structures for the ongoing public 
negotiation of socio-technical change that is 
the essence of sustainability.
Formal platforms could take the form of an 
annual international conference and ongoing 
research programme exploring disruptive low 
carbon innovation. This could build on existing 
major arenas for innovation policy discussion, 
such as Shanghai’s annual Pujiang Innovation 
Forum. This platform would involve not just 
policymakers and scholars of innovation, but 
also the innovators themselves and other 
stakeholders. Sponsorship for disruptive 
innovators to participate in these events would 
encourage them to come forward themselves, 
solving to some extent the problem of the 
ongoing hunt for interesting and important 
examples. A high-profile set of awards (like 
the UK’s Ashden Awards) associated with the 
conference could provide further incentive. And 
lending government support and sponsorship 
to such a programme would also deepen the 
engagement of policymakers in these learning 
processes and help publicise and valorise the 
importance of the opportunities for disruptive 
low carbon innovation more broadly.
Regarding informal interaction, national and 
international platforms for match-making 
innovators could be pursued, again with official 
government support. Active mediators may 
also be needed, including the work of NGOs 
such as GEI, especially where these interactions 
depend upon opening of networks to parties 
who have no prior connections, as will often be 
the case in projects focused on socio-economic 
development. Sponsorship of such mediation 
is thus another important target for policy 
support.
Who should pay for these initiatives at the 
international level? Significant contributions 
should undoubtedly be from developed 
countries, including the UK, given their moral 
responsibility for leading efforts to respond 
to climate change. Matched funding from all 
parties (or approximations thereof), however, 
does provide the best basis for productive 
collaborations based on mutual benefit. As is 
often already the case, however, this could well 
take the form of in-kind contributions rather 
than actual financial assistance, so that simply 
hosting these events in China would be a major 
step towards such parity. Both developed 
country sponsorship and Chinese ‘matching’ 
are thus possible.
Low carbon innovation in China is a singularly 
important issue for China and the world as a 
whole, at the heart of the key global challenges 
for the 21st century of sustainable and 
equitable development. By explicitly addressing 
these five considerations in the formulation 
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of policy and hence supporting its existing 
strengths in ‘game-changing’ disruptive low 
carbon innovation, including via mutually 
beneficial international collaboration, China 
could lead the global low carbon transition that 
we need in the next 40 years.
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GEI (Global Environment Institute) – Snow Mountain Organic Vegetable Corporation.
Beijing and Lijiang, Yunnan Province, China.
Renewable energy and organic agriculture.
36 farmers are involved in the project.
GEI’s rural biogas project in Lijiang began in 2004.
Initial funding from overseas aid funds, together with funding from Lijiang government 
for biogas digesters and Beijing government for technical support.
GEI is a Chinese NGO committed to setting up “market-based solutions to 
environmental problems to achieve sustainable development”. Snow Mountain is part 
of a full system transition toward sustainable low carbon agriculture incorporating 
biogas digesters and organic vegetable farming.
Savings of 4.2t per year of firewood and combustion of 550m3 of methane that would 
otherwise be released leads to savings of about 22 t CO2e per household. Increasing the 
model to include 10,000 households would generate annual savings of about 220,000 t 
CO2e. Impacts from avoided deforestation increase this figure further, as do reductions 
in use of mineral fertiliser regarding its production, transport and release of N2O, which 
is nearly 300 times as potent a GHG as CO2. As a result, 70 per cent of agricultural 
emissions come from nitrogen fertiliser.
GEI’s work encourages farmers to shift over to low carbon forms of agriculture and 
heating, while also attending to their paramount concern of stable and higher earnings. 
Snow Mountain is a private limited company that sells organic vegetables from Lijiang 
farmers to markets in large Chinese cities on the coast. The farmers are aggregated into 
cooperatives to improve economies of scale and to increase access to finance. Stable 
sales of lucrative organic vegetables have increased farmers’ incomes and add to the 
economic viability of the biogas digesters provided by GEI, which produces the organic 
fertiliser or slurry. The digesters also produce enough methane to service cooking 
requirements. This reduces demand for wood (4.2t per household per year), and so 
deforestation (about 8 mu or 1.3 acres or 0.5 hectares of forest per year), while also 
burning methane – a much more potent GHG than CO2 – that would otherwise simply 
be released into the atmosphere. 
2004-2006: GEI begins work in Lijiang with the introduction of biogas digesters, 
bought from a company in Hunan and tailored by GEI to local circumstances and users’ 
demands. Half of funding for building materials is provided by Lijiang government, the 
other half being demanded of the farmers. Further efforts are thus needed to make 
the gains from the biogas digester economically attractive. GEI accordingly sets to 
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2006-2008: It also establishes a number of rural credit cooperatives, involving 6 or 
more farmers in each case. These RCCs can access bank loans, but also can aggregate 
sales of their organic produce, introducing economies of scale. Organic vegetable 
cultivation grows to sixty mu (9.9 acres, 4 hectares), producing 80t vegetables per year. 
Finally, a share-holding company, Snow Mountain, is established to match sales from 
Lijiang with demand from Beijing, Shanghai and the Pearl River Delta. Investment in 
Snow Mountain includes two Chinese shareholders, three from the US and GEI itself. 
Snow Mountain also funds consultation and advice from Yunnan Agricultural University 
for training the farmers in organic agriculture.
2009: The funding for GEI ended in December 2008. Farmers’ incomes are raised by 
the project (some 12.5 times) and Snow Mountain continues to trade successfully. 
Urbanisation, however, threatens some of the land occupied by farmers with biogas 
digesters.
Coordinating all of the various elements of the full system transition involved was in 
itself a significant barrier.
Such a comprehensive solution was necessary to get the farmers to engage with and 
commit to the changes, and hence make the most efficient low carbon use of their 
biogas digesters.
Establishing the cooperatives was also problematic. Encouraging the farmers to 
participate was difficult given previous experiences of collective agriculture, and legal 
status for these cooperatives was only achieved after July 2007, when the central 
government enacted the Law on Specialised Cooperatives.
Lack of funding for the project and shortage of investment remained a problem and 
continues to do so regarding rolling out to other locations. Poor transport infrastructure 
is one main consideration regarding investment – trains are usually too slow for the 
perishable organic vegetables, while planes will not transport cargo, only people, during 
winter months. Low carbon forms of transport for organic vegetables have yet to be 
developed, while markets for organic produce are weak or non-existent outside the 
largest Chinese cities, even in large provincial cities such as Kunming.
GEI is exporting its model to other developing countries, including Sri Lanka and Laos. 
The success in Sri Lanka has been such that the Sri Lankan government has been 
concerned that all farmers will start to demand biogas digesters. Funding for these 
overseas ventures is available from the Chinese central government, but investment in 
expanding the model within China is not. GEI instead continues to look for investors, 
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Himin Group.
Dezhou, Shandong province, China.
Solar thermal energy.
4,000+ staff in Dezhou, 50,000+ nationwide.
1992, officially incorporated 1995.
Originally established with self-funding.
Himin builds solar thermal equipment, focusing on high reliability and low cost as well 
as combination with other technologies to produce a range of products and solutions.
An average 2 sq m water tank serving a family’s daily hot water needs saves 300kg coal, 
or 700 kg CO2e, per year. In a population of 1.3 billion, 200 million water tanks could 
save 140 Mt CO2e per year in China alone. Further emissions savings are possible from 
bigger boilers for public buildings and alternative applications, such as central heating, 
high temperature solar thermal electricity generation and industrial applications.
Solar thermal energy uses concentrated sunlight to heat a medium, usually water. 
As a low-cost and low carbon technology, it is an attractive option for many Chinese 
customers, with capital expenditure recouped within five years and free hot water or 
energy thereafter. 
Founder and CEO Huang Ming is not merely a green entrepreneur but a national, 
indeed international, celebrity. Himin Group is now the largest solar thermal company 
not only in China but in the world; a sector that is internationally dominated by Chinese 
companies.
The business strategy has been to produce low-cost solutions to energy and heating 
that directly attract customers and so do not depend upon government subsidy. Based 
in Dezhou, Shandong province, the success of Himin has increasingly attracted the 
attention of local, provincial and national government, but the company remains self-
sustaining. Competition in the industry is deemed essential and welcome.
1982-1992: Huang Ming is working as a research fellow within the state-owned 
petroleum sector under the Ministry of Mineral Resources studying the future 
of mineral resources. Confronted by the size and imminence of the associated 
environmental problems and deeming that “commercialisation of renewable energy 
is the only way out”, he determines to set up a company working within renewable 
energy. He founds a small company in the name of his research institute.
1992-2000s: Deciding that solar thermal energy offers considerable opportunities, 
he starts out making solar thermal water heaters, initially by hand. As there is no 
government support for his ventures, he has to rely on building demand based on the 
attractiveness of his products and services to potential customers. Virtue is made of 
necessity, focusing on the strategy of negotiation and learning between producers and 
customers in the creation of attractive products. Significant learning experience and 
R&D improves the efficiency, reliability and longevity of the boilers, reduces the price 
and adds important services, such as installation.
Himin is formally established in 1995, changing its name from Xinxing Hi-tech Co. Ltd. 
2000s-present: Himin continues to grow, with revenues rising to RMB 2 billion by 
2007 and the solar thermal industry as a whole in home town of Dezhou reaching 
800,000 or 30 per cent of the workforce. Government support also grows, including for 
R&D projects, including four projects under the national 863 programme. Himin now 
owns in excess of 200 patents. 
2008-present: Work begins on the Sun-Moon Mansion, a conference centre heated 
and powered entirely by solar thermal and solar PV energy. It is due to be completed in 
2010. 
In recognition of the international significance of the company, Goldman Sachs invests 
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Himin also invests over RMB 1 billion in construction of two demonstration projects: 
‘International Environmental-friendly Energy Conservation Demonstration Zone’ and 
‘Chinese Solar Energy Demonstration Town’.
Himin also establishes a number of training centres, including: a school for professional 
engineers within the solar thermal industry, a second for academic engineers and a third 
for business managers within the industry; and a university sited on a 200,000 sq m 
campus, due to open mid-2010.
Lack of investment and government support from the outset posed considerable 
hurdles, though the low-cost and customer-focused disruptive strategy of Himin has 
responded to these challenges.
Standards for quality control of boilers, as well as lack of governmental support for 
capacity building, education and training of (future) staff and R&D have also been 
significant issues.
More recently, growth of the market has been such that the main problem is having 
sufficient production capacity to meet demand. As the applications for solar thermal 
grow, increasing demand, and sales have been concentrated to date in Shandong and 
surrounding provinces, problems of capacity are expected to persist.
Himin will focus in the short- to medium-term on building market strength in other 
areas of China, growing capacity and developing new products in combination with 
solar thermal technologies. Solar buildings are considered a particular opportunity, 
focusing on the opportunities to use solar thermal and solar PV building materials as 
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Hangzhou ISAW Technology Corporation.




CEO and founder Yuan Yijun funded the company himself. The national government has 
also provided some funds for research. 
Provide core technology, equipment and service to exploit psychrometric principles 
for low carbon processes, including air-conditioning, energy recovery and solar 
desalination.
For energy recovery, if all the cigarette factories in China were to use this system, 
100,000 t CO2e per year could be saved. The system, however, can also be used in other 
industries, such as coal-fired power plants. Reduced emissions for a 1,000MW power 
plant would be about 40,000 tonnes of coal or 100,000 t CO2e. 
For air-conditioning, a 5 per cent market share in China would save 30 Mt CO2e. 
For solar desalination, one solar desalination plant with capacity 100,000 t water per 
day would save 1.5 Mt CO2e per year.
Hangzhou ISAW Technology Corporation is devoted to commercialisation – including 
products, engineering and services – and R&D of different core technologies related to 
psychrometric energy (integrating solar, air and water).
Psychrometric energy has three main applications namely, energy recovery, air-
conditioning and desalination. 
Energy recovery includes macro and micro heat and mass cycle, the former involving a 
pump to drive the water that realises heat and mass transfer between the heat sink and 
heat source (i.e. energy recovery) while the latter relies only on the cycling of water 
through temperature and concentration differences. 
The green air-conditioning process is driven by thermal energy, such as solar or waste 
heat, which concentrates salt water via water evaporation. This concentrated salt water 
then absorbs moisture from the air and reduces the enthalpy of the air, producing 
a cooling effect. The process occurs under ambient pressure, without compressors 
or vacuums, and only water (pure and salt) is used, not other potentially polluting 
chemicals such as CFCs. 
The desalination process is also a thermal driven process, again using solar or waste 
heat to evaporate salty water and condense the vapour as pure water. The condensation 
process also releases heat, which energy is reused, hence very little thermal energy is 
required for the process. 
2007: Following an unsuccessful cooperation with a company for air-conditioning in 
2006, Yuan Yijun decides to set up his own company, motivated by a vision of a large 
future market in green air-conditioning and energy recovery. He sets up Hangzhou 
ISAW in Hangzhou in order to commercialise his technologies based on psychrometric 
energy.
Joint research with Nottingham University testing ISAW air-conditioning products 
begins.
2008: ISAW air-conditioning is used in a new housing development in Shenzhen by 
Vanke Corporation, one of the largest real estate companies in China. 
2009: Many projects on energy recovery are carried out in cigarette factories. 
A solar desiccant cooling system is also contracted for the Shanghai 2010 International 
Expo and an India research institute.
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The cooling system produced by ISAW is introduced in a report of the World Society of 
Sustainable Energy Technology regarding the Masdar eco-city project in Abu Dhabi.
Negotiations also begin regarding an international cooperation on solar desalination. 
The Hangzhou ISAW has found attracting investment and support from government 
or venture capital difficult for several reasons. First, the company is too small to attract 
government attention and to be approved as a ‘hi-tech’ innovative company not sited 
in a special hi-tech zone. Secondly, as a small start-up, ISAW has no formal R&D centre 
or separate group of R&D personnel and so cannot easily apply for government R&D 
funding. Thirdly, the low carbon incentive policies focus on the large companies who 
are users of the technologies, such as cigarette factories or construction companies, not 
the company who is providing and innovating such technologies. Finally, ISAW’s CEO 
is a scientist by training who is still learning how to present a business plan that will 
attract financial investment.
Future plans include increasing strategic investment from venture capital and 
other sources, such as Earth Power Group, as well as working with other partners 
to improve the development of the company and diffusion of technologies. ISAW 
is also considering a cooperation to set up a new company in order to enlarge the 
market for low carbon building that includes its air-conditioning technologies. 
Regarding desalination, ISAW is looking for some industrial companies with which 
to commercialise and diffuse the technology. Regarding energy recovery, ISAW will 
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Lüyuan Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd.
Jinhua, Zhejiang Province, China.
Transportation products.
More than 2,000 in 2009.
1996.
Originally supported by Jinxin Technological Venture Capital Co.
Design, R&D, production and service of e-bikes. 
The CO2 emissions of an electric bicycle over 10,000km (e.g. an annual commute of 
20km both ways) is around 96kg, around 5 per cent of the emissions of a car running 
the same distance. This gives a conservative estimate of savings of at least 1 tonne per 
year per vehicle. 
To provide an environmentally-friendly vehicle to ordinary people in order to meet the 
energy challenges of China’s rapidly growing economy. 
Lüyuan in Chinese means ‘green power’, referring to the greater (potential for) 
sustainability of electricity vs. petroleum. The bicycle is a popular form of transportation 
in China but it needs physical effort, especially uphill, and takes a long time to 
travel long distances. Most Chinese people cannot afford a car, but they need cheap 
and convenient transportation. The electric bicycle offers a solution to all these 
requirements. 
Lüyuan is not only a successful pioneer in the e-bike industry but also a leader in 
championing the e-bike cause in China, recognising the importance of changing 
existing concepts and aspirations about ways of life and helping people accept new 
things. Lüyuan is also a key member of the national committee for formulation of 
national standards on e-bikes and main components, including lead batteries.
1996: After visiting a research institute in Beijing working on an electric vehicle, Ni 
Jie, founder and CEO of Lüyuan, decides to invest in the electric bicycles. With the 
support of Jin Xin Technological Venture Capital Co., after three months research and 
development, Ni successfully develops the first e-bike in China.
1997: Commercialisation begins and Lüyuan Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. is formally 
incorporated in Jinhua. Lüyuan e-bikes are also permitted on roads, the same as bikes, 
in Jinhua.
1998: Starts to sell in Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province. Zhejiang government 
issues a local regulation to manage the development of the e-bike and its right to the 
road. Lüyuan joins the formulation of national standards on e-bikes. The year ends with 
Lüyuan facing bankruptcy because of the poor quality of its battery.
1999: Bouncing back, Lüyuan’s production base is established in August and it 
introduces the first e-bike batteries matching national standards.
2001-2005: Lüyuan breaks into profitability in 2001, with rapid growth in this period. A 
serious challenge, however, comes from regulations in Beijing, Fuzhou and other cities 
forbidding e-bikes from roads. In the new traffic law of China issued in October 2003, 
the e-bike is officially classified as a kind of non-motor vehicle. 
2005-2006: Established as a pioneer of the e-bike industry, Ni Jie is elected as one of 
the ten best and most famous businessmen in Zhejiang in 2005. Other honours include 
the award of ‘Zhejiang Brand’.
2007: A new, expanded manufacturing base is opened. Lüyuan is recognised as one of 
50 fast-growing companies by the magazine ‘Fast Company’ alongside Nike, Honda, 
etc.
2008: Ni Jie authors two traffic security reports about two-wheel electric vehicles, the 
first such reports in China.
2009: The central government plans to launch a new e-bike regulation to restrict 
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large percentage of e-bikes produced by Lüyuan (and others) will be classified as an 
e-motorcycle, which people cannot ride without a driving licence. The regulation would 
pose the most serious crisis in the Chinese e-bike industry. At the last minute, the new 
regulation is postponed. When it will be introduced remains undecided.
Since they are widely accepted by consumers, being inexpensive and convenient, 
e-bikes were approved in most of Chinese cities by 2004. The most serious barrier faced 
by the Lüyuan, however, has been local regulations forbidding e-bikes from roads or 
restricting e-bike specifications. For instance, in 2002, Beijing city government banned 
them on the basis that e-bike traffic was hard to manage and the batteries caused 
pollution. Fuzhou city government and a few others followed suit. 
Such debates often focus on whether the e-bike is a bicycle or a motorcycle; many 
e-bikes look like a motorcycle and have maximum speeds of e up to 40-50km/h. 
Some people also overload their e-bikes with heavy and large goods. Because of these 
problems, the central government formulated a new standard for e-bikes in 2009 
following long consultation from 2004. Under the new standard, e-bikes with maximum 
speed above 20km/h and weight above 20kg are to be classed as electric motorcycles, 
not electric bicycles. Riding these e-motorcycles requires a driving test, as for a car. 
Introduction of this new regulation would significantly reduce demand. Lüyuan is 
responding by developing technology to restrict the maximum speed and to reduce the 
possibility of illegal reequipping.
Despite the regulatory challenges, Lüyuan is continuing to build its R&D programme, 
including development of three-wheel electric vehicles for the disabled and elderly and 
































Initially funded by Angel Investment fund. Further venture capital is expected in early 
2010.
Target existing market opportunities for fuel cells, together with significant 
simplification of the technology, allowing time to develop the technology and new 
products.
In portable applications and UPS, fuel cells will replace lead-acid batteries with both 
lead pollution and energy savings, due to the higher efficiency of the recharging 
process. One 1 kW fuel cell, average operating time about 300 hrs per year, can 
generate about 200 kWh electricity. The efficiency is twice that of an internal 
combustion engine, so one 1 kW fuel cells can save about 40 kg standard coal (94kg 
CO2e). 
A simplified fuel cell targeted at applications for which there is already an economic 
case, rather than targeting the familiar goal of electric vehicles from the outset.
Fuel cells are usually cooled by a water-based cooling system, which adds considerable 
complexity to the fuel cell stack as well as weight. Pearl Hydrogen has developed a way 
to cool the fuel cell using air, thereby using the same channels for the fuel cell reaction 
and the cooling process. This reduces costs of production and also cuts accessory 
energy costs. The core technology is a catalyst-coated membrane that allows air-
cooling, leading to a fuel cell with higher efficiency. 
The company has decided to target applications for this technology in the first instance 
that are immediately profitable, rather than focus on development of a fuel cell vehicle 
– the usual goal of fuel cell companies. Three applications have been identified and 
developed to date, namely: stationary ‘uninterrupted power supply’ (UPS) emergency 
back-up generators, e.g. for telecommunication base stations; an electric bicycle and 
other niche transportation equipment; and a portable power source.
2006: The company is founded by Brian Tian and Dong Hui, following R&D work since 
2003 at other Chinese fuel cell companies. A 200W prototype fuel cell is developed.
2007: The prototype is converted into a 200W product. This is integrated into an 
electric bicycle in collaboration with Celimo, a Chinese bicycle manufacturer. In 2008, 
the bicycle makes its debut in European market.
Work also continues on integrating fuel cells in more powerful stacks for alternative 
applications. In 2009, Pearl puts importance in the application of UPS and works with 
ZTE to draft out Chinese standard for fuel cell powered UPS. In 2010, some samples 
will be complete by Pearl and its partners.
Market research is conducted regarding the most profitable applications for the 
technology, with UPS as the most obvious candidate.
R&D and testing of the fuel cell also continues, improving the technology and 
demonstrating its high reliability, high efficiency and low cost.
2008: The electric bicycle Green Angel is displayed at the Zaragoza International Expo. 
The bikes go on sale in China with a view to targeting markets in Italy and elsewhere in 
Europe.
Fuel cells of 2000W also goes on sale, targeting the UPS market in China and south 
east Asia. Major contracts are signed with private industrial intermediaries to provide 
UPS fuel cells to major Chinese telecom SOEs.
2009: A collaboration with Imperial College, London is established for the development 
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Pearl is also approached by an Italian company Acta, listed on the London AIM stock 
exchange, for collaboration in the development of a full system solution for a hydrogen 
fuel cell bicycle. Acta produces a high-pressure electrolyser that allows home generation 
of the hydrogen fuel source for the bicycle’s fuel cell from the user’s tap water. 
A further collaboration with Acta Energy develops a portable hand-held power source 
powered by Pearl’s fuel cells with power range between 50W~5kW.
2010: A 10kW fuel cell is expected to be applied in niche transportation tools.
Although commercialisation in niche transportation and the UPS field is considered 
easier than for the car industry, government and investors put less importance on the 
two industries.
In the near future, Pearl will continue to focus on UPS and the niche transportation 
industry.
Some demonstration of fuel cells-powered UPS will be carried out in 2010 in China. 
In the next two years, Pearl will work with its partners to develop more applications in 
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Self-funding and Government funding for individual projects.
Production of biomass pellets from agricultural residues and biomass combustion 
equipment, focusing on local collection of raw materials and distribution of pellets.
Domestic boilers save about 10 t CO2e per year, the patented cooking stove saves 
about 1.2 t CO2e per year and industrial/ building heating boilers save about 265 t 
CO2e per heating season, in each case compared to coal combustion.
Under the slogan “We care and we do biomass” Shengchang aims significantly to 
reduce carbon footprints from heating and cooking by providing locally sourced 
biomass pellets to replace coal.
Biomass pellets are made from a range of agricultural residues, including wood chips, 
corn and cotton stalks and peanut shells. These are collected from farmers within a 
20km radius of the pellet-making plants, delivered by the farmers themselves in return 
for RMB 160 per tonne. By turning these residues into efficiently burning feedstocks, 
inefficient combustion of both coal and the residues themselves on the farm is avoided.
Pellets are then delivered by the company to customers, either in 50kg bags or, for 
industrial users, in a specially adapted truck as bulk.
To ensure maximal efficiency of the combustion of the pellets, Shengchang has also 
developed its own boilers, using technology from Tsinghua University in Beijing that 
was not otherwise commercialised, and a patented cooking stove. Tests have been 
done by third parties (including Tsinghua) regarding emissions from these boilers using 
Shengchang pellets with very favourable results regarding emissions vis-à-vis coal (see 
above). SO2 savings are also considerable, at less than 10 per cent of coal combustion.
Both the boilers and the fuel are also relatively low-cost and an economical option for 
both individuals and business customers. The pellets are sold at RMB 550 per tonne 
(versus RMB 950 per tonne for coal at 2008 prices) and only about 25 per cent more by 
mass is needed. The boilers are also cost effective, especially with a RMB 300 subsidy 
for the RMB 400 cost from the Beijing municipality, while the stoves sell at under RMB 
200 each.
2006: Shengchang is founded by CEO Fu Youhong, building on his entrepreneurial 
experience in the pharmaceutical industry and motivated by environmental concerns in 
rural areas. He conducts extensive research in China and Europe regarding options for 
renewable energy. Biomass is chosen from the various possibilities as an industry with 
potentially significant GHG emissions reductions, this being the priority. Were profit the 
primary consideration, wind or solar would have been chosen instead.
A demonstration plant making 4 t/day biomass pellets from sawdust is set up in Lixian, 
a rural county of Beijing, with support of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA).
2007: Following success of the demonstration project, two further plants are 
established, also in rural counties of Beijing.
Subsidies for pellets are provided by the Beijing government at RMB 147 per tonne. 
Residues are bought at RMB 160 per tonne and sold at RMB 550 per tonne, with 
three tonnes of residue making one tonne of pellets to start with (this ratio has since 
improved to 1.2:1).
Over the summer, 200 students, funded by the Beijing municipal government and MoA, 
conduct a transport feasibility study. The report, in January 2008, concludes that plants 
must be within 20km of farmers if they are to consider delivering residues worthwhile.
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2008: A boiler factory is established in Daxing Industrial Development Area in south 
Beijing, manufacturing domestic and industrial hot-water boilers and a patented 
cooking stove, which is targeted to replace the inefficient coal-burning stoves that 
are used everywhere across China. The combustion equipment has been developed by 
Shengchang.
2008/9: Big projects include a greenhouse project at Zhangziying, with 400 boilers 
heating 200 greenhouses; an industrial boiler to heat the Economic Times building 
(18,000 sq m, 2.1MW); a successful demonstration house in Tongxian district using 
biomass together with solar power that leads to the ‘Double Hundred’ project to build 
100 biomass-solar public bathrooms for farmers in 100 villages; and an industrial 
demonstration in Daxing district of Beijing (0.7MW). 
Sales of both pellets and boilers are solicited from across China (e.g. Hubei, Hunan, 
Heilongjiang, Guangdong, Tibet), and five sets of negotiations to establish new plants 
are entered into. To meet this demand, a pelleting-machine factory is established 
in Haidian district, Beijing. The company is moving steadily towards profitability 
(regardless of government subsidy).
Encouraging farmers to change their routines and habits and shift towards both selling 
their agricultural residues and using biomass boilers instead of coal has been difficult. 
Government has provided considerable support, in the form of the transport survey, 
pellet subsidy, boiler subsidy and funding for some R&D. Experience with the new 
boilers has also served to encourage other farmers to follow suit, especially due to the 
reduction in smoke, which improves the living environment.
The business model was not immediately viable without government support but is 
quickly moving into profit. Fu was lucky enough to have good contacts from his former 
work in the pharmaceutical industry to access such support. However, continuing 
government support for the coal industry undermines the economic case for shifting 
to biomass, just as it presented Shengchang with a closed system into which it had 
to break when starting out. And most government attention in renewable energy is 
focused on solar PV and wind.
Shengchang plans to expand its locally sourced biomass model across China, following 
on the openings already under negotiation. As people become more aware of the 
problems – ecological and economic – associated with coal and oil and experience 
shortages of energy (e.g. during the cold snap at the end of 2009) growing demand for 
alternative energy sources is expected. Despite some interest from Europe, it is not at 
this stage deemed strategically worthwhile to pursue opportunities overseas. 
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Beijing Sinen En-tech Co. Ltd (ZNHK).
Beijing, China.
Energy efficiency and water purification.
The company has five branches and five offices across China, an experimental base, an 
R&D centre at China University of Petroleum and its Beijing headquarters. 
2004.
RMB 600,000 from founder CEO Yang Yucheng and partners, followed by further RMB 
2 million from a Xinjiang investment company.
ZNHK is the leading company in China (and worldwide) offering high-temperature 
filtration and recycling of water from industrial processes that meets new Chinese 
national standards of water purity. 
A typical industrial plant using 100t/hour of steam will save 8400t of coal per year 
(≈22,000 t CO2e per year) by reducing the energy demands on heating cold water. 
Water use is also significantly reduced – another significant impact given existing 
strains on water usage.
Twenty plants have been fitted in five years to 2009, and installation has been 
improved, reducing the time it takes from three months to one. Accordingly a total of 
60 plants could easily be completed by 2015. Total annual GHG emissions reductions 
would then be 13.2 Mt CO2e.
ZNHK reduced emissions from industrial plants by reducing the energy consumed 
in heating water into steam. Yang’s tenet for the company is “resources saving and 
environmental conservation with benefits”.
Many industrial processes involve huge volumes of water being converted into steam. 
This both uses significant amounts of energy and contaminates the water, which must 
then be treated before legal release. In China, 70 per cent of this water is discarded 
while 30 per cent is recycled back into the industrial process. However, cleaning this 
water usually involves cooling the water first in order to be effective. Accordingly, 
recycling still generally requires wasting the energy of heating the water. ZNHK has 
developed a patented filtering technology – an ultrafine membrane filter combined with 
adsorption by microfibres – that allows filtering to take place at elevated temperatures 
while also filtering the water to exceptionally high standards. As 1 per cent fuel is 
saved for each 6°C, this has significant impacts on overall emissions from these plants. 
Cost savings from reduced fuel and water consumption are also considerable, allowing 
capital expenditure to be recovered within one year.
1980s-2004: Yang Yucheng works for large petrochemical Sinopec in research on 
energy saving and conservation, together with colleagues from China University of 
Petroleum. There he develops the core water treatment membrane technology.
2004: Yang sets out on his own to commercialise the technology. There is no interest 
in investing from banks, a fledgling venture capital sector or the government but Yang 
manages, with partners, to raise RMB 600,000 of their own money. This is followed 
by a RMB 2 million investment from an investment company in Xinjiang specifically 
interested in the technology.
The company achieves certification as a high-tech enterprise in Beijing’s 
Zhongguancun, following legislative revisions by central government that include 
environmental technologies under the title of ‘hi-tech’.
2005-2007: Projects begin, with ZNHK targeting Sinopec and other petrochemical 
SOEs as initial customers, given that directives from central government to deal with 
energy efficiency creates the necessary demand for their product and services. Learning 
from these projects improves the technology and the service, while R&D continues 
separately on associated applications.
Profitability is reached in 2006.







































  Beijing Sinen En-tech Co. Ltd (ZNHK)
49
2008: Business continues to grow, revenues reaching RMB 35 million, and the company 
is awarded a number of honours including: certification as a national hi-tech company; 
a cover story in Forbes China; and high rankings in Deloitte’s ‘high-tech with high-
growth’ rankings for China and Asia-Pacific.
Technologies continue to be improved, for example, an on-line monitoring system 
developed to shut off and redirect water flow in the event of higher than normal 
concentrations of pollutants in the filtered water.
2009: ZNHK grows to four branches and five sales offices across China.
Negotiations with overseas companies also begin for introduction of the technology to 
the US and for establishing a leasing company to increase the financial attractiveness of 
the service.
When founded in 2004, attracting start-up finance was very difficult and, in the 
end, abandoned. Much has changed in China since then regarding both the overall 
attractiveness of investment in energy efficiency and growth of the venture capital 
sector. However, investment remains by no means straightforward.
Accessing the financial and fiscal benefits of ‘hi-tech’ status was also crucial to the 
company, especially in its early stages. This was only possible, however, following a 
redefinition by central government in late 2004. 
The strategy of using SOEs, primarily from the petrochemical industry, as initial 
customers has been successful, but is entirely dependent upon central government 
policy setting energy efficiency as a priority. Accessing the broader market of smaller 
and/or private companies in which government directives have less sway has proven 
more of a challenge, but improving their service and product through accumulated 
experience is crucial in this regard.
ZNHK is developing its sales across China and moving beyond petrochemical companies 
to increase sales in other industries that use steam boilers. As 95 per cent of production 
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